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**CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL  
CALCUTTA BENCH  
KOLKATA**

OA No.350/00476/2015

Reserved on 09.03.2016  
Date of order: 17.03.2016

**PRESENT:**

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VISHNU CHANDRA GUPTA, JUDICIAL MEMBER  
THE HON'BLE MS. JAYA DAS GUPTA, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER

.....  
Sri Jayanta Guha, son of Late Kanailal Guha residing at 393,  
Mohishila Colony, Post Office Asansol-3, Police Station-  
Asansol, Dist. Burdwan.

.....Applicant

For the Applicant: Mr.S.Banerjee, Counsel

-Versus-

1. The Union of India service through the Secretary, Ministry of Steel, Government of India having its office at New Delhi, Pin-110 001.
2. The Steel Authority of India Limited, a Government of India undertaking, service through its Chairman, having its office at Ispat Bhawan, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110 001 and also having its office at 50 Chawringhee Road, Kolkata-700 071.
3. The Chairman, Steel Authority of India Limited having his office at Ispat Bhawan, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110 001.
4. The Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited, a Unit of Steel Authority of India Limited, service through its Managing Director having its office at Burnpur Works, Burnpur, Dist. Burdwan, Pin-713 325.
5. The Managing Director, Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited, Steel Authority of India Limited having his office at Burnpur Works, Burnpur, Dist. Burdwan, Pin-713 325.
6. The General Manager (Personnel & Administration), Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited, Steel Authority of India

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Limited, having his office at Burnpur Works, Burnpur, District-Burdwan, Pin-713 325.

7. The Assistant General Manager (PI), Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited, Steel Authority of India Limited having his office at Burnpur Works, Burnpur, Dist. Burdwan, Pin-713 325.
8. The Assistant General Manager (Finance), Pay and Provident Fund Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited, Steel Authority of India Limited having his office at Burnpur Works, Burnpur, Dist. Burdwan, Pin-713 325.
9. The Deputy General Manager (Personnel), Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited, Steel Authority of India Limited having his office at Burnpur Works, Burnpur, District-Burdwan, Pin-713 325.
10. The Assistant General Manager (Personnel), Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited, Steel Authority of India Limited having his office at Burnpur Works, Burnpur, District-Burdwan, Pin-713 325.
11. The Assistant Manager (MM), Refectory and Stores and CRS, Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited, Steel Authority of India Limited having his office at Burnpur Works, Burnpur, District-Burdwan, Pin-713 325.

.....Respondents

For the Respondents: Mr.L.K.Pal, Counsel

### ORDER

#### JAYA DAS GUPTA, AM:

The Applicant, Shri Jayanta Guha, a retired employee of the Indian Iron and Steel Co Limited, has filed this Original Application U/s. 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 seeking the following reliefs:

"(a) To direct the respondent authorities concerned to forthwith rescind/withdraw and/or cancel the impugned letter, bearing reference No. CPD/1710 dated March 12, 2015 issued by the General Manager (Personnel & Administration), Indian Iron and Steel

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Company Limited, Steel Authority of India Limited with immediate effect and all order/orders, if any, passed by the respondent authorities concerned pursuant to the order of this Hon'ble Tribunal dated February 20, 2015 thereby confirming the Notice of Superannuation dated September 30, 2014 and also further confirming the date of superannuation of the present applicant as on March 31, 2015.

(b) To direct the respondent authorities concerned to forthwith allow the present applicant to continue his service till the actual date of superannuation i.e. on March 31, 2017 after taking into consideration of his actual date of birth as on March 22, 1957."

(Extracted as such)

2. The contention of the applicant is that he was appointed as a Khalasi of SM Department in the Plant i.e. Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited, Steel Authority of India Limited on March 3, 1975.

It is admitted that at that point of time he had not appeared at the Higher Secondary Examination conducted by the West Bengal Board of Secondary Examination. This Examination was held in the month of April, 1975 in which he passed with Second Division. His Date of birth as mentioned in the Board's Certificate is "22.03.1957".

His main contention is that it is the accepted policy to give credence to the date of birth as given in the School Leaving Certificate namely Higher Secondary Examination Certificate. In this case and the date of birth of the applicant as mentioned there is "22.03.1957". Therefore, his actual date of superannuation will

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be '31.03.2017'. But the Respondents have illegally retired him from service on '31.03.2015'. He has objected to such premature retirement and having received no tangible result, he had earlier approached this Tribunal in OA No. 211/2015 which was disposed of on 20.2.2015 directing the respondents to consider his representation and communicate the decision thereof prior to 31.03.015. It has been alleged that despite the above direction, the respondents retired him from service prematurely after rejecting his representation and being aggrieved of such action of the respondents he has filed the current OA in this second round of litigation with the aforesaid reliefs.

3. On the other hand, the stand of the Respondents is that at the time of induction into service, the applicant was not able to produce any papers regarding his educational qualification or proof in support of his age. Therefore in such a situation, as per the prevalent Rules of the company, the applicant had to undergo examination by the Medical Board and on examination by the duly constituted medical Board, the age of the applicant was determined as 20 years as on the date of entry in service on 03.03.1975 corresponding to the date of birth as 03.03.1955.

Accordingly, the applicant was superannuated from service on reaching the age of superannuation w.e.f. March 31, 2015. It has been stated that the entire action was taken as per

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the Rules and, the applicant has no ground of grievance and therefore, this OA is liable to be dismissed.

4. The issue for consideration is whether the respondent authorities legitimately superannuated the applicant on 31.03.2015 when the date of birth of the applicant as mentioned in West Bengal Higher Secondary Examination is 22.03.1957 and accordingly he should be retired on 31.03.2017.

5. It is an admitted fact that when the applicant entered service in Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd on 03.03.1975, he had not appeared at the Board's examination which was held in April, 1975. The question is why did not the applicant give any documentary proof of his age to the respondents by way of furnishing any certificate from the school authority where he was studying before the Board Examination to show his correct date of birth. It is the contention of the respondents that as the applicant did not produce any papers regarding his educational qualification and proof of age, as per the standing order of the Company his age was required to be determined by the Medical Board. Subsequently, the duly constituted Medical Board determined the age of the applicant as 20 years as on 03.03.1975 corresponding to the date of birth of the applicant as 03.03.1955. The fact of the aforesaid date of birth was determined by the Medical Board was within the knowledge of the applicant. Since he did not raise any objection at that relevant point of time

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i.e about the year 1975 such determination of the date of birth which was recorded in his service book proves that he was fully satisfied with the recording of such date of birth at that point of time. It has been contended that at the time of entry into service, the applicant had put his signature in the first page of the service record sheet wherein his age was clearly mentioned corresponding to the date of birth as March, 1955 and not 22.3.1957.

It has further been stated by the respondents that if the date of birth as given in the certificate issued by the Higher Secondary Board of examination was indeed taken as 22.03.1957, then it would be evident that at the time of his appointment i.e. on 03.03.1975 he was under age of 18 years and not eligible for appointment. If his actual date of birth is accepted as 22.03.1957 his age would have been 17 years, 11 months and 12 days only in other words he was short of 19 days to complete the 18 years so as to be eligible for appointment under any Government. Thus he had played fraud on the employer by suppressing his actual age at the time of entry into service taking assistance of which the applicant illegally wanted to enjoy two extra years of service.

Another contention of the respondents is that on coming to know of his date of birth recorded as 22.3.1957, in Higher Secondary Examination Certificate he represented his case to other Departments but not to the Personnel Department of the

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Company knowing fully well that it is the Personnel Department of the Company who is the appropriate authority maintaining all service records and they are the custodian to maintain correct records of date of birth. This is borne out by the fact that the applicant has relied on a document placed at Annexure-A/6 which is a letter dated 25.6.2005 written by Jr. Executive (P1), NV stating therein that the applicant is a permanent employee of the Indian Iron and Steel Co Ltd and his date of birth is 22.3.1957. This certificate has been given for the purpose of obtaining bank loan from the SBI, Burnpur. But reacting to this letter at Annexure-A/6, the respondents contended that such certificate cannot be accepted in so far as the date of birth recorded in service record is concerned as such certificate recording the date of birth is entrusted to be given only by the Personnel Department of the Company and not by any other authority of the Indian Iron and Steel Co Limited.

6. It is noted that only on 29.3.2013 when he was close to retirement, for the first time, the applicant made a representation (Annexure-A/8) to the General Manager (Personnel and Administration) Burnpur to the effect that he learnt only in recent past from different sources that his service tenure shall be terminated in March, 2015 as purportedly his date of birth in the personal record remains as 03.03.1955. In the above circumstances, he had appealed for

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restoration of his date of birth as 22.3.1957 as noted in his West Bengal Higher Secondary Examination Certificate. It is, however, noted that this representation to the Personnel Department has been made as late as 29.3.2013 which is very close to his date of superannuation. Nothing is on record to exhibit that he has made any such representation for change of his date of birth to the Personnel Department prior to 29.3.2013.

7. Such belated request for change of date of birth has been deprecated by the Hon'ble Apex Court. The Government of India instruction in the matter of change of date of birth made close to the date to the expected date of superannuation is very clear on the point that no such representation/appeal for change of date of birth close to the date of superannuation can be entertained by any authority. The DoP&T OM No. 19017/2/92-Estt.(A) dated 19.5.1993 is extracted hereunder for ready reference:

F.No. 19017/2/92/Estt.(A)  
Government of India  
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions  
(Department of Personnel and Training)  
New Delhi dated 19.5.1993.

**OFFICE MEMORANDUM**

Subject: Alteration of date of birth of a Government Servant- Civil Appeal No. 502 of 1993 –Union of India vs Harnam Singh –Judgment dated 9<sup>th</sup> February, 1993 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

As Ministry of Finance etc. are aware, the DP&AR Notification No. 19017/7/79-Estt. (A) dated 30<sup>th</sup> November, 1979 (incorporated as Note 6 below FR-56) which was published as SO 3997 in the

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Gazette of India dated 15.12.1979 and came into force from that date, provides inter alia that a request for alteration in date of birth can be made by a Government servant only within 5 years of his entry into Government service. Further while incorporating the condition of 5 year time limit for making a request for alteration in the date of birth in the Service records, no distinction was made in respect of Government servants already in service vis-a-vis the further recruits. Despite the clear rule position, references continue to be received in this Department from various Ministries/Departments seeking clarification regarding applicability or other wise of the provisions relating to time limit of 5 years to employees who were appointed to civil posts prior to the date of effect of the Notification i.e. 15.12.1979. In a recent judgment given by the Supreme Court on 9.2.1993 in Civil Appeal No. 502 of 1993 (Union of India Vs Harnam Singh), the Supreme Court has inter alia observed that in regard to the Government servants who had joined service prior to 1979 the correction of date of birth should be made within a period of 5 years from 1979. Relevant extracts from the said judgment are reproduced below:

"It would be appropriate and in tune with harmonious construction of the provisions to hold that in the case of those Government servants who were already in service before 1979, for a period of more than five years and who intended to have their date of birth corrected after 1979 may seek the correction of date of birth within a reasonable time after 1979 but in any event not later than five years after the coming into force of the amendment in 1979. This view would be in consonance with the intention of the rule making authority."

2. References are also frequently received in this Department recommending belated requests from Government servants for alteration in date of birth giving some justifications or other in support of the request. The observations made by the Supreme Court in the case cited in para 1 above on this point are reproduced below:

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"Inordinate and unexplained delay" or laches on the part of the respondent to seek the necessary correction would in any case have justified the refusal of relief to him. Even if the respondent had sought correction of the date of birth within five years after 1970 the earlier delay would not have non suited him but he did not seek correction of the date of birth during the period of five years after the incorporation of note 5 to FR 56 in 1979 either. His inaction for all this period of about thirty five years from the date of joining service, therefore, precludes him from showing that the entry of his date of birth in service record was not correct."

3. The Government policy regarding rejection of belated claim for alteration in date of birth is thus reinforced by the observation made by the Supreme Court in the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 502 of 1993 (Union of India Vs Harnam Singh). The Ministry of Finance etc is therefore, requested to keep this position in view while considering any request from a Government servant for alternation in his date of birth. In other words, it will not be appropriate to consider any request for alteration in date of birth if the conditions stipulated in note 6 below FR 56 are not strictly fulfilled.

3. It is, requested that these instructions may also be duly brought to the notice of the Attached Subordinate Offices under the Ministry of Finance etc. For information and compliance.

Sd/- (V.Natarajan)  
Deputy Secretary to the Govt. Of India"

8. So it is very clear from the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court that representation for change of date of birth canot be made belatedly. When the superannuation notice was issued by the Company, the Applicant approached this Tribunal in OA No. 211 of 2015 with the plea that since as per the certificate issued by the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education his date of birth

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is 23<sup>rd</sup> March, 1957 he ought to have been allowed to superannuate on 31.03.2017. The relevant portion of the order dated 20.02.2015 passed by this Tribunal in OA No. 211 of 2015 is quoted hereunder:

"7. Since the applicant is supposed to retire on superannuation on 31.03.2015 in terms of the notice impugned herein, there is some urgency in the matter. In such view of the matter, we direct the respondent authorities to dispose of the representation dated 27.11.2014 in the light of the official records as well as service book and the Higher Secondary Education Certificate as contained in Annexure A-2, within a period of 15 days from the date of communication of this order, and to communicate the decision to the applicant immediately thereafter. In case the date of birth is reckoned as 22.03.1957, the date of retirement as reflected in the notice dated 30.09.2014, shall be reviewed and an appropriate order shall be passed. The entire exercise shall be completed prior to 31.03.2015."

9. In compliance of the aforesaid order of this Tribunal, the Respondents issued the order dated 18.3.2015 rejecting the prayer of the applicant which is quoted hereunder:

"The applicant was appointed as a Khalasi on March, 03, 1975 under the erstwhile Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited. The then Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited has been merged with Steel Authority of India Limited and has been renamed as Steel Authority of India Limited, IISCO Steel Plant.

The applicant Sri Guha moved one original application being OA 211 of 2015 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, Calcutta and prayed for his correction of date of birth.

After hearing the Learned Advocates for the parties, the Hon'ble Tribunal on February 20, 2015 was pleased to dispose of such application inter alia by directing the respondents to consider the appeal filed

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by the applicant wherein he prayed for his correction of date of birth. From perusal of the original application it appears that Sri Guha relied upon Permanent Engagement Form wherein his date of birth was recorded as 22<sup>nd</sup> March, 1957 and further a certificate dated 25<sup>th</sup> June, 2005 issued by the Junior Executive wherein the employer certified that the date of birth of the applicant is 22<sup>nd</sup> March, 1957. He also relied upon the date of birth as mentioned in the service record card and also on the Provident Fund Loan application wherein he mentioned his date of birth as 22<sup>nd</sup> March, 1957.

Shri Guha was appointed as Khalasi on March 03, 1975. At the time of appointment he was asked to produce the valid and authenticated documents showing proof of age. He could not produce any such document from where his date of birth could be proved. The provision for standing order is squarely applicable upon the applicant workman. The provision of such standing order clearly provides that in the event, a particular workman is unable to produce any documentary evidence showing proof of age, his/her age will be assessed by the medical board. The medical board was formed who determined age of the workmen like the applicant who could not produce the document showing proof of age. The age of the applicant was determined by such medical board as 20 years as on 03.03.1975. (date of birth being 03.03.1955). Such recording of date of birth was well within the knowledge of the applicant and the applicant never raised any objection about such determination of date of birth, since he himself appeared before the medical board. From the certificate of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education annexed with the original application, it appears that is date of birth is 22<sup>nd</sup> March, 1957. If such date of birth is to be taken into consideration then he was under age and not eligible for appointment on 03.03.1975.

He thereafter persuaded the C.T.O to get a permanent engagement form and by recording the date of birth as 22<sup>nd</sup> March, 1957. The certificate dated 25<sup>th</sup> June, 2005 has been relied upon by the applicant of Junior Executive (PL-NW) of the then Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited who was not authorized and competent to issue such certificate for change of date of birth in absence of any representation/appeal for change of date of birth. On his persuasion without

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read '22/6/2023'.

looking into his service file in particular the entries relating the date of birth, the Junior Executive issued such certificate which cannot be relied upon, as it is a well settled principle of law that where the incumbent at the time of entry into service failed to show/produce any documentary evidence regarding his date of birth, his age was correctly determined by the medical board and that the recording of date of birth cannot be altered or changed under any circumstances. Subsequently, the applicant had applied for service certificate for purpose of bank loan from SBI, Burnpur on 09.11.2009. After that a service certificate bearing No. ISP/PER/NE/SRVC/67269 dated 11.11.2009 was prepared in which the correct date of birth had been given (copy enclosed).

**The correction of date of birth according to procedure is considered by the Personnel Department and not by any other department.** Without going through the service file of the applicant the CTO and Junior Executive gave certificate and made some statement that his date of birth is 22<sup>nd</sup> March, 1957 wherein the medical board at the initial stage correctly determined the date of birth of the applicant as 3<sup>rd</sup> March, 1955.

It is a well settled principle of law that once date of birth was recorded according to the assessment made by the Medical Board and was accepted by the workman, subsequent request made by the workman to change the same on the basis of the school certificate cannot be acceded to. **The date of birth in the service book is conclusive and cannot be altered or corrected at the fag end of the service career.**

Further he has put his signature on the 1<sup>st</sup> page of Service Record Card containing his age as determined by the Medical Board and other personal details, as a token of acceptance of the entries made therein.

That the date of birth mentioned in the Declaration ad Nomination Form of Provident Fund the details mentioned in the Identity Card, Medical Treatment Book are all his own declaration. Since the same has not been supported countersigned by the competent authority of Personnel Department, the

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applicant cannot take advantage of such recording of date of birth. Further the loan application is not also authenticated, countersigned, supported by the Personnel Department, since the Personnel Department has not issued any order/letter correcting his date of birth.

Hence, it is stated that the representation as made by the applicant Jayanta Kumar Guha, for correction of his date of birth cannot be accepted to. Hence the matter is disposed of.

Sd/-A.K.Das  
General Manager (P&A)"

Consequently, the applicant following the superannuation notice issued on 30.09.2014 (A/11) was retired from service w.e.f. 31.03.2015. Going through the above speaking order, we do not feel that there is any need to interfere in the matter.

10. Another aspect of this case needs examination. The respondent authorities have alleged fraud on the part of the applicant. It is their contention that if the applicant insists that his date of birth is March, 1957 and not March, 1955 as recorded by the respondent authorities, then it is clear that he entered service before 18 years of age and this was well within his knowledge. His plea of illegally extending his service by two years together with the fact of entering service as a minor amounts to fraud on the employer.

The Hon'ble Apex Court has strongly deprecated such action in the following cases:

(1) **Hamza Haji vs State Of Kerala & Anr, 2006 Vol. 7**  
SCC 416 – *The basic principle obviously is that a party*

who had secured judgment by fraud should not be enabled to enjoy the fruits thereof.

(2) **Indian Bank vs M/S Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt.Ltd,**

1996 Vol. 5 SCC 550 – Fraud and deceit defend or excuse no man (*Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant*).

Fraud and justice never dwell together (*Fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent*);

(3) **R. Vishwanatha Pillai vs State Of Kerala & Ors,**

2004 SCC (L&S) 105 – Unless a person can lay a claim to the post on the basis of his appointment he cannot claim the constitutional guarantee given under Article 311 and cannot be considered to be a person who holds a post within the meaning of Article 311.

Where an appointment in a service has been acquired by practising fraud or deceit, such an appointment is no appointment in law, in service and in such a situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted at all.

(4) **Eastern Coalfields Ltd. and others Versus Bajrangi**

**Rabidas**, 2014 Vol. 13 SCC 681. Relevant portion of the decision is quoted herein below:

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"17. On an apposite reading of the instructions there can be no iota of doubt that the date of birth mentioned in Matriculation or Higher Secondary certificate has to be accepted as authentic. But, a pregnant one, as has been indicated hereinbefore, the case at hand depicts a different picture. The respondent did not produce the Matriculate Certificate, though he had passed the said examination. It is because, we are inclined to think, had he produced the said certificate, he could not have undertaken the examination and consequently could not have been appointed. To secure an appointment, as has been found in the enquiry, he made a statement that he had not obtained the certificate though he had passed the examination and the same was accepted by the Welfare Officer of the then private company.

18. The question that arises for consideration is that once he had availed the benefit by not stating the correct fact, whether the equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be extended to him. The Division Bench has recorded a finding the respondent could not have been allowed to participate in the examination without producing the Matriculation certificate. The said finding is based on an assumption and has been arrived at totally being oblivious of the enquiry report which records the statement of the respondent. In this context, we may profitably reproduce a passage from Union of India v. C. Rama Swamy and others:

"25. In matters relating to appointment to service various factors are taken into consideration before making a selection or an appointment. One of the relevant circumstances is the age of the person who is sought to be appointed. It may not be possible to conclusively prove that an advantage had been gained by representing a date of birth which is different than that

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which is later sought to be incorporated. But it will not be unreasonable to presume that when a candidate, at the first instance, communicates a particular date of birth there is obviously his intention that his age calculated on the basis of that date of birth should be taken into consideration by the appointing authority for adjudging his suitability for a responsible office. In fact, where maturity is a relevant factor to access suitability, an older person is ordinarily considered to be more mature and, therefore, more suitable. In such a case, it cannot be said that advantage is not obtained by a person because of an earlier date of birth, if he subsequently claims to be younger in age, after taking that advantage. In such a situation, it would be against public policy to permit such a change to enable longer benefit to the person concerned."

[Underlining is ours]

19. The controversy can be viewed from another angle. Thereafter, the learned Judges opined that there is no justification in the proposition that principle of estoppels would not apply in such a situation. As is manifest, in the case at hand the respondent stated this on the higher side to gain the advantage of eligibility and hence, we have no trace of doubt that principle of estoppel would apply on all fours. It is well settled in law that jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is equitable and discretionary. The power of the High Court is required to be exercised "to reach injustice wherever it is found". In *Sangram Singh v. Election Commissioner, Kotah and another*, it has been observed that jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not to be exercised whenever there is an error of law. The powers are purely discretionary and though no limits can be placed upon that discretion, it must be exercised along recognized lines and not arbitrarily and one of the limitations imposed by

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the courts on themselves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in such class of cases unless substantial injustice has ensued or is likely to ensue. That apart, the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can always take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances and pass appropriate directions to balance the justice. The jurisdiction being extraordinary it is required to be exercised keeping in mind the principles of equity. It is a well-known principle that one of the ends of equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If a person has taken an undue advantage the court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would be within its domain to deny the discretionary relief. In fact, Mr. Singh, learned senior counsel for the appellants, has basically rested his submission on this axis. In our considered opinion, the Division Bench has erred in extending the benefit to the respondent who had taken undue advantage by not producing the Matriculation Certificate solely on the motive to get an entry into service. It is apt to note here that this Court in G.M., Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., West Bengal v. Shib Kumar Dushad and others has ruled that the decision on the issue of date of birth of an employee is not only important for the employee but for the employer also."

Going through the above observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court; it is clear that the conduct of the applicant is not above board when on the one hand he has joined the service as a minor, being below 18 years of age as per his own statement that his date of birth is 22.03.1957 and then demanding benefit of two additional years of service based on a certificate which he did not produce at the time of entry into service. Significantly, he did not produce any certificate from any other source justifying his date of birth.

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12. In view of the facts and law discussed above, we find no merit in this OA which is accordingly dismissed by leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

(Jaya Das Gupta)  
Member (Admn.)

(Justice ~~V.C.~~ Gupta)  
Member (Judicial)

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