

**CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, JABALPUR BENCH**  
**JABALPUR**

**REVIEW APPLICATION NO.200/00024/2019**  
**(in OA No.200/01006/2017)**

Jabalpur, this Thursday, the 04<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2019

**HON'BLE SHRI NAVIN TANDON, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER**

Smt. Anita Katare (Bain) W/o Late Shri Suresh Katare, aged about 42 years, Occupation Unemployed C/o Shri Shankar Lal Bain, R/o House No.1534, Narsingh Nagar, Chandra Shekhar Ward, Ranjhi District  
Jabalpur (MP) 482005

**-Applicant**

**V e r s u s**

1. Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Defence, South Block, New Delhi – 110001.
2. Chief C.D.A. (Pensions) Dropati Ghat, Allahabad (U.P) – 211001.
3. Garrison Engineer (West) Military Engineer Service – C/o 56 APO  
Jabalpur (M.P) – 482002

**- Respondents**

**O R D E R (in circulation)**

This Review Application has been filed by the applicant to review the order dated 02.05.2019 passed by this Tribunal in Original Application No.200/01006/2017.

**2.** From perusal of the order under review it is found that the aforesaid OA No. was dismissed after hearing the learned counsel of both sides and after perusal of the pleadings of the respective parties.

Para 9 of the order reads as under:

**“9.** In this case, it is clear that the employee of the respondent department died on 25.12.1992 and his spouse

expired on 12.01.2013 (Annexure A-3). Perusal of the judgment of the Family Court (Annexure A-4) clearly mentions that the application for divorce was filed on 25.10.2013. It is evident that the divorce proceedings have commenced after the death of family pensioner. Therefore, in terms of Para 6 of Office Memorandum dated 19.07.2017, the applicant is not entitled for grant of family pension.

**3.** In the garb of the present Review Application the applicant is praying for rehearing of his Original Application by raising new grounds to challenge the action of the respondents, which were not agitated at the time of final hearing, which is not permissible.

**4.** It may be noted that scope of review under the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1, CPC, which provision is analogous to Section 22 (3) (f) of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is very limited. Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1995 (1) SCC 170 **Meera Bhanja (Smt.) Vs. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (Smt.)** referring to certain earlier judgments, observed that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record. An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established

by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error can not be cured in a review proceeding.

**5.** The power of review available to this Tribunal is the same as has been given to a Court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The apex court has clearly stated in **Ajit Kumar Rath Vs. State of Orissa and others**, (1999) 9 SCC 596 that: “a review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it”. This Tribunal can not review its order unless the error is plain and apparent. It has clearly been further held by the apex court in the said case that: “[A]ny other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment”.

**6.** It is also settled principle of law that the Tribunal cannot act as an appellate court for reviewing the original order. This proposition of law is supported by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

case of **Union of India Vs. Tarit Ranjan Das**, 2004 SCC (L&S) 160

wherein their lordships have held as under:

“The scope for review is rather limited and it is not permissible for the forum hearing the review application to act as an appellate authority in respect of the original order by a fresh order and *rehearing of the matter to facilitate a change of opinion on merits*. The Tribunal seems to have transgressed its jurisdiction in dealing with the review petition as if it was hearing an original application”.

**7. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of State of West Bengal and others Vs. Kamal Sengupta and another**, (2008)2 SCC (L&S) 735 scanned various earlier judgments and summarized the principle laid down therein, which reads thus:

“35. The principles which can be culled out from the above-noted judgments are:

(i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/ analogous to the power of a civil court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

(ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

(iii) The expression “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds.

(iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f).

(v) An erroneous order/ decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review.

(vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench of the tribunal or of a superior court.

(vii) While considering an application for review, the tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent.

(viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court/tribunal earlier.”

**8.** I am, therefore, of the view that the law noticed hereinabove is squarely applicable in the present case and since no error apparent on the face of record has been pointed out or established, the present Review Application is misconceived and is liable to be dismissed.

**9.** In the result, the Review Application is dismissed at the circulation stage itself.

**(Navin Tandon)**  
**Administrative Member**

*Am/-*