

**CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH:
NEW DELHI**

R.A. No.257 of 2018
M.A.No.5197 of 2018
in
O.A. No.470 of 2017

This the 11th day December 2018

Hon'ble Ms. Nita Chowdhury, Member (A)

Union of India & others, through :

1. The General Manager,
North Central Railway,
Allahabad.
2. The General Manager,
Northern Railway,
Baroda House,
New Delhi
3. The Divisional Railway Manager,
North Central Railway,
Allahabad Division,
Allahabad.

....Review Applicants

(Filed by Shri Anil Kumar Srivastava, advocate)

VERSUS

Smt. Radha Devi (Aged about 50 years)
W/o late Sh. Balawant Singh,
R/o: C/o Dhirender Kumar & Sh. Veer Singh,
H.No.501, First Pusta,
Kathewara, New Usmanpur,
Delhi-110053 -

....Review Respondent

O R D E R (In Circulation)

MA No.5197/2018 & RA 257/2018

The said MA has been filed by the review applicants (respondents in original *lis*) seeking condonation of delay in filing the Review Application, vide which the review applicants

are seeking to review the Order passed on 25.9.2018 passed in OA 470/2017, and sought condonation of delay of 24 days in filing the Review Application. The instant MA as well as RA was filed on 7.12.2018.

2. As per the provisions of Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the review has to be filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order sought to be reviewed. The review applicants have pleaded in the instant MA that due to official procedure of the review applicants department where it was being diligently followed even then there is some delay in filing the Review Application, it is deeply regretted. However, this Court finds that the Order under Review was of 25.9.2018 and the Review Application along with this MA has been filed on 7.12.2018 and as such there is certainly delay of more than 30 days in filing the Review Application, but taking a lenient view, this Court allows the present MA. Accordingly, the delay in filing the Review Application is condoned.

3. This Court perused the said Order under Review as well as Review Application. The grounds taken in the present Review Application are not based on any error apparent on the face of record. In fact, the review applicants are questioning the conclusion arrived at by this Bench in the said Order. If this Court agrees to his prayer, this Court

would be going into the merits of the case again and re-writing another judgment of the same case. By doing so, this Court would be acting as an appellate authority, which is not permissible in review. In the case of ***Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma***, [AIR 1979 SC 1047], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-

"It is true as observed by this Court in *Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab*, AIR 1963 SC 1909, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which is inherent in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all matters or errors committed by the Subordinate Court."

Again in the case of ***Ajit Kumar Rath vs. State of Orissa and others***, 1999 (9) SCC 596, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-

"The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The power can be exercised on the application of a person on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. **It may be pointed out that the expression "any other sufficient reason" used in Order 47 Rule 1 means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the rule.**

Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment."

[Emphasis added]

In the case of ***Gopal Singh vs. State Cadre Forest Officers' Assn. and others***, (2007 (9) SCC 369), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-

"The learned counsel for the State also pointed out that there was no necessity whatsoever on the part of the Tribunal to review its own judgment. Even after the microscopic examination of the

judgment of the Tribunal we could not find a single reason in the whole judgment as to how the review was justified and for what reasons. No apparent error on the face of the record was pointed, nor was it discussed. Thereby the Tribunal sat as an appellate authority over its own judgment. This was completely impermissible and we agree with the High Court (Justice Sinha) that the Tribunal has traveled out of its jurisdiction to write a second order in the name of reviewing its own judgment. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant did not address us on this very vital aspect."

4. Thus, on the basis of the above citations and observations made hereinabove, this Court comes to the conclusion that it was not open to the review applicants to question the merits of the decision taken by this Tribunal. In fact, he could have pointed out only some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason or on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, but no such thing is pointed out in any of the grounds taken in the Review Application. As such this Review Application is devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed in circulation.

**(Nita Chowdhury)
Member (A)**

/ravi/