

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, JABALPUR BENCH
CIRCUIT SITTING:INDORE

Original Application No.201/00176/2017

Indore, this Monday, the 6th day of August, 2018

HON'BLE SHRI NAVIN TANDON, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER
HON'BLE SHRI RAMESH SINGH THAKUR, JUDICIAL MEMBER

Ishwarlal Purohit, S/o Shri Raisingh Purohit
Aged 62 Yrs. approx.
Occu.Retired Post Master HSG-I
Address 72 Mukharji Nagar
Ratlam (M.P.) 457001

-Applicant

(By Advocate –**Shri Arpit Oswal**)

V e r s u s

1. Union of India through,Chief Post Master General
M.P. Circle Bhopal (M.P.) 12

2. The Post Master General , Indore Region
G.P.O. Indore (M.P.) 452001

3. The Superintendent of Post Offices
Ratlam Division, Ratlam (M.P.) 457001

- Respondents

(By Advocate –**Shri Kshitij Vyas**)

O R D E R

By Navin Tandon, AM.-

The applicant is aggrieved by the fact that recovery of amount of Rs.1,75,703.50 was imposed upon him without departmental enquiry in a minor penalty charge sheet. Hence, this Original Application has been filed.

2. The applicant has made the following submissions in this Original Application:

2.1 The applicant assumed the charge on the post of Postmaster at Post Office, Ratlam on 01.09.2009 and retired on 28.02.2014.

2.2 The Service Tax department issued a show cause notice to the Ratlam Postal Department on 26.06.2008 and thereafter a final order of imposing service tax including a penalty of Rs.3,51,407/- was issued on 09.06.2009.

2.3 The last date for filing appeal to challenge the said order of the Service Tax department was to end on 24.08.2009. Accordingly, the applicant wrote several letters to the respondents on 01.07.2009, 07.08.2009, 20.08.2009 and 24.08.2009 for taking assistance of legal experts in the matter.

2.4 It has been brought out that this service tax recovery was for the assessment year 2004-05 and 2005-06. It is pertinent to mention that the instructions of the Central Government Service Tax was made applicable to the Government Departments from April, 2006.

2.5 Respondent No.3 granted approval to file appeal on 10.03.2010 after engaging an advocate in the matter. Further,

on 22.03.2010, the respondent No.3 sanctioned an amount of Rs.7,500/- in advance for payment of fees to the advocate for preparation of the brief.

2.6 Pursuant to the instructions and approval of the respondent No.3, the applicant preferred appeal on 25.03.2016 (sic). The applicant submits that the departmental sanction from the higher authority of the applicant was received only on 10.03.2010. Hence, there is no lacuna on the part of the applicant.

2.7 The respondent No.3 issued a chargesheet to the applicant under Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 on 22.11.2013 (Annexure A-3) for failing to file appeal within allowed time causing financial loss of Rs.3,51,407/- to the department.

2.8 The applicant submitted his representation on 30.11.2013 (Annexure A-4).

2.9 Based on the response of the applicant, respondent No.3, on 19.12.2003 (Annexure A-2), imposed a penalty of recovery of Rs.1,75,703.50, which was to be deducted from the salary of the applicant at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per month and balance from the DCRG.

2.10 The applicant filed a revision petition on 03.06.2014 (Annexure A-5) to respondent No.1, who rejected the same vide his order dated 30.12.2015 (Annexure A-1).

3. The applicant in this Original Application has prayed for the following reliefs:-

***“8(i)** This Hon’ble Tribunal may kindly be pleased to call for the entire relevant record for kind perusal of this Hon’ble Tribunal.*

***8(ii)** This Hon’ble Tribunal may kindly be pleased to quash /set aside the order dated 30.12.2015 passed by the Respondent No.2 dismissing the revision of the applicant affirming the order passed by the respondent No.3.*

***8(iii)** This Hon’ble Tribunal may kindly be pleased to quash/set aside the order dated 19.12.2013 passed by the Respondent No.3 of imposition of the penalty of Rs.175703.50/- over the applicant and to recover the same from the salary and the DCRG of the applicant.*

***8(iv)** This Hon’ble Tribunal may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to return the amount of Rs.1,75,703.50/- deducted from the salary /DCRG of the applicant along with interest @ 18% per annum.*

***8(v)** Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit be also granted along with the cost of the application.”*

4. The respondents, in their reply, have furnished the whole background information regarding the payment of Rs.3,51,407/- by them to Central Excise Department. Even though this payment was not due from a Government Department, the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation, as there was a delay in preferring the

said appeal before the Commissioner in 182 days. The respondent department approached the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore, but did not get any relief. The extracts from the reply of the respondents are as under:

4.1 The applicant was on the post of Postmaster Ratlam Head Post Office, who is authorized for filing the service tax returns as per rules on time as the notice from service tax department was received it was the responsibility of Postmaster Ratlam HO to short out the issue at his level only. He delayed the case by forwarding the responsibility to higher authority. He made appeal on dated 22/3/2010 which was too late.

4.2 As per departmental inquiry all the alleged officials are punished and imposed penalty and recovery has been made. The amount of share of applicant only has been recovered from his Pay and DCRG benefit.

4.3 As per departmental inquiry all the officials due to whom the case was delayed are already punished and the process of recovery has been made as per rules.

4.4 The SDIP Ratlam was instructed for necessary action at that time. As per Departmental inquiry he was also alleged official. The recovery has been already made from him.

4.5 The mentioned letter was given on the last date of presenting the case which seems just to prevent himself only from any further departmental inquiry. Postmaster Ratlam HO already instructed to present the appeal to Commissioner Service Tax department Indore on dated 25/8/2009.

5. Heard the learned counsel of parties and carefully perused the pleadings of the respective parties and the documents annexed therewith.

6. It was brought to our notice that the applicant, in his representation (Annexure A-4) against the chargesheet and again in this O.A, has brought out that he wrote several letters on 01.07.2009, 07.08.2009, 20.08.2009 and 24.08.2009 to the respondents. This fact has not been refuted by the respondent No.3 neither in his order dated 19.12.2013 (Annexure A-2) nor in the reply to this O.A.

7. During the course of arguments, the main argument advanced on behalf of the applicant was that, no full-fledged departmental enquiry was conducted against the applicant while imposing a huge amount of recovery from his salary as well as from his DCRG. Therefore, the same is not sustainable in the eye of law.

8. This Tribunal had an occasion in the recent past to decide a similar issue in the matter of **Jyoti Goyner Vs. Union of India and others**, Original Application No.202/00459/2017 decided on 11.01.2018. Relevant paragraphs of the said order read thus:

*“(5). Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant could not have been penalized as there is no direct relation with the allegations made against the applicant to the loss caused to the Government by fraudulent transactions which took place in Bhind. The recovery of amount of Rs.2,88,000/- has no reasonable basis as the amount is not connected to any of the figures in the allegation. It was further submitted that though a minor penalty has been imposed on the applicant under Rule 16 of 1965 Rules, but in fact it is a major penalty because every month Rs.8,000/- is to be deducted from the salary of applicant for 36 months, and thus, the said recovery is excessive punishment on the applicant without conducting a regular departmental enquiry. In support of the claim, the learned counsel for the applicant has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matters of **Union of India and others Vs. Ajay Agrawal**, M.P. No. 1798 of 2017, decided on 02.01.2018.*

(6). Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings and the documents submitted by the respective parties.

*(7). We have also carefully gone through the facts of the instant case as well as the decision of the Hon’ble High Court in the matters of **Ajay Agrawal** (supra), relevant paragraphs of the said order read thus:*

*“A Division Bench of this Court in **Union of India and Anr. Vs. C.P. Singh** [2004 (2) MPJR 252] had an occasion to examine the issue as to whether an inquiry can be dispensed with, in all cases where the penalty purposed is recovery of pecuniary loss caused by negligence or breach of orders categorized as minor penalty? Their lordships taking note of decisions in **C.R. Warriar Vs. State of Kerala** (1983 (1) SLR 608), **V. Srinivasa Rao Vs. Shyamsunder** (ILR*

1989 Ker. 3455); G. Sundaram Vs. General Manager, Disciplinary Authority, Canara Bank (ILR 1998 Kar. 4005); O.K.Bhardwaj Vs. Union of India and others [(2001) 9 SCC 180] and Food Corporation of India Vs. A. Prahalada Rao [(2001) 1 SCC 165] were pleased to observe:

“(16). The position as can be gathered from the Rules and the aforesaid decisions can be summarised thus:

(i) In a summary inquiry, a show cause notice is issued informing the employee about the proposal to take disciplinary action against him and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on which such action is proposed to be taken. The employee is given an opportunity of making a representation against the proposal. The Disciplinary Authority considers the records and the representation and records of findings on each of the imputations of misconduct.

(ii) In a regular inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority draws up the articles of charge and it is served on the employee with a statement of imputation of misconduct, list of witnesses and list of documents relied on by the Department. The Disciplinary Authority calls upon the employee to submit his defence in writing. On considering the defence; the Disciplinary Authority considers the same and decides whether the inquiry should be proceeded with, or the charges are to be dropped. If he decides to proceed with the enquiry, normally an Inquiring Authority is appointed unless he decides to hold the inquiry himself. A Presenting Officer is appointed to present the case. The employee is permitted to take the assistance of a co employee or others as provided in the rules. An inquiry is held where the evidence is recorded in the presence of the employee. The employee is permitted to inspect the

documents relied upon by the employer. The employee is also permitted to call for other documents in the possession of the Management which are in his favour. The delinquent employee is given an opportunity to rebut the evidence of the management by cross-examining the management witnesses and by producing his evidence both documentary and oral. Arguments-written and/or oral-are received/heard. The delinquent employee is given full opportunity to put forth his case. Therefore, the Inquiring Authority submits his report. The copy of the report is furnished to the employee and his representation is received. Thereafter the Disciplinary Authority considers all the material and passes appropriate orders. The detailed procedure for such inquiries is contained in sub-rules (6) to (25) of Rule 9 of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 corresponding to sub-rules (3) to (23) of Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1965 and M.R Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1966.

(iii) The normal rule, except where the employee admits guilt, is to hold a regular inquiry. But where the penalty proposed is a 'minor penalty', then the Rules give the Disciplinary Authority a discretion to dispense with a regular inquiry for reasons to be recorded by him, and hold only a summary enquiry.

(iv) Though the Rules contemplate imposing a minor penalty without holding a regular enquiry, where the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that such enquiry is not necessary, such decision not to hold an enquiry can be only for valid reasons, recorded in writing. Dispensation with a regular enquiry where minor penalty is proposed, should be in cases which do not in the very

nature of things require an enquiry, for example, (a) cases of unauthorised absence where absence is admitted but some explanation is given for the absence; (b) non-compliance with or breach of lawful orders of official superiors where such breach is admitted but it is contended that it is not wilful breach; (c) where the nature of charge is so simple that it can easily be inferred from undisputed or admitted documents; or (d) where it is not practicable to hold a regular enquiry.

(v) But, even where the penalty proposed is categorised as minor penalty, if the penalty involves withholding increments of pay which is likely to affect adversely the amount of pension (or special contribution to provident fund payable to the employee), or withholding increments of pay for a period exceeding three year or withholding increments of pay with cumulative effect for any period, then it is incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to hold a regular inquiry.

(vi) Position before decision in FCI:

Where the charges are factual and the charges are denied by the employee or when the employee requests for an inquiry or an opportunity to put forth the case, the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority is virtually taken away and it is imperative to hold a regular inquiry.

Position after decision in FCI:

Where the Rules give a discretion to the Disciplinary Authority to either hold a summary enquiry or regular enquiry, it is not possible to say that the Disciplinary Authority should direct only a regular enquiry, when an employee denies the charge or requests for an inquiry. Even in such cases, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to decide, for reasons to be recorded, whether a regular

enquiry should be held or not. If he decides not to hold a regular enquiry and proceeds to decide the matter summarily, the employee can always challenge the minor punishment imposed, on the ground that the decision not to hold a regular enquiry was an arbitrary decision. In that event, the Court or Tribunal will in exercise of power of judicial review, examine whether the decision of the Disciplinary Authority not to hold an enquiry was arbitrary. If the Court/Tribunal holds that the decision was arbitrary, then such decision not to hold an enquiry and the consequential imposition of punishment will be quashed. If the Court/Tribunal holds that the decision was not arbitrary, then the imposition of minor penalty will stand.

(17). It is also possible to read the decisions in Bharadwaj and FCI harmoniously, if Bharadwaj is read as stating a general principle, without reference to any specific rules, that it is incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to hold a regular enquiry, even for imposing a minor penalty, if the charge is factual and the charge is denied by the employee. On the other hand, the decision in FCI holding that the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to dispense with a regular enquiry, even where the charge is factual and the employee denies the charge, is with reference to the specific provisions of a Rule vesting such discretion.

(18). There is yet another aspect which requires to be noticed. Where the penalty to be imposed though termed as minor, is likely to materially affect the employee either financially or career-wise then it is not possible to dispense with a regular enquiry. In fact, this is evident from sub-rule (2) of Rule-11 which says that where the penalty to be imposed, though termed as

minor penalty, involves withholding of increments which is likely to affect adversely the amount of pension or special contribution to provident fund, or withholding of increments of pay for a period exceeding three years or withholding of increments of pay with cumulative effect, then an enquiry as contemplated under Rule-9 (6) to (25) is a must. Thus, categorisation of penalties into 'major' and 'minor' penalties, by itself may not really be determinative of the question whether a regular enquiry is required or not.

(19). While 'censure' and withholding of increments of pay for specified period may conveniently be termed as minor punishments, we feel very uncomfortable with 'recovery of pecuniary loss, for negligence or breach of 'orders' without stipulating a ceiling, being considered as a 'minor penalty'. 'Recovering small amounts, as reimbursement of loss caused to the employer by way of negligence or breach of orders from the pay of the employee can be a minor penalty. But can recovery of huge amounts running into thousands and lakhs, by way of loss sustained on account of negligence or breach of orders, be called as a minor penalty ? For example, in this case, recovery sought to be made from the petitioner is Rs.75,525/- determined as being 50% of the total value of 74 rail posts. Theoretically, what would be the position if the loss was 740 or 7400 rail posts.? Does it mean that recovery of Rs.7.5 lakhs or Rs.75 lakhs can be ordered from the Government servant, still terming it as a minor penalty, without holding any enquiry? It is time that the State and authorities take a second look as what is termed as 'minor penalty' with reference to recovery of losses. The recovery of pecuniary loss on account of negligence or breach of order though termed as a minor penalty may have disastrous consequences, affecting the livelihood of the

employee, if the amount sought to be recovered is huge.

(20). In the absence of any ceiling as to the pecuniary loss that can be recovered by treating it as minor penalty, it is necessary to find out whether there is any indication of the limit of amount that can be recovered without enquiry, by applying the procedure for imposition of minor penalties. We get some indication of the pecuniary limit in Rule-11 (2) which provides that if the minor penalty involves withholding of increments of pay for a period exceeding three years then a regular enquiry is necessary. Thus, we can safely assume that the pecuniary loss proposed to be recovered exceeds the monetary equivalent of increments for a period of three years, then a regular enquiry has to be held.

(21). The fastening of pecuniary liability on the basis of negligence or breach of orders, involves decision on four relevant aspects:

- (a) What was the duty of the employee?*
- (b) Whether there was any negligence or breach of order on the part of the employee while performing such duties?*
- (c) Whether the negligence or breach of order has resulted in any financial loss to the employer?*
- (d) What is the quantum of pecuniary loss and whether the pecuniary loss claimed include any remote damage and whether the employer has taken steps to mitigate the loss?*

These are not matters that could be decided without evidence, and without giving an opportunity to the employee to let in evidence. Therefore, where the charge of negligence or breach of lawful order is denied, a regular enquiry is absolutely necessary before fastening financial liability on the employee, by way of punishment or recovery of pecuniary loss from the employees. However, having regard to the decision in FCI, regular inquiry can be dispensed with, for valid reasons, if the amount to be recovered is small (which in the absence of a

specific provision, does not exceed the equivalent of three years increment at the time of imposition of penalty). Any attempt to fasten any higher monetary liability on an employee without a regular enquiry, by terming it as a minor penalty, would be a travesty of justice.'

Careful reading of these decisions and applying the principle of law in the facts of present case leaves no iota of doubt that the disciplinary authority acted arbitrarily in dispensing from holding a regular departmental enquiry for no recorded reasons. Or even if there were reasons the same were not communicated. The impugned order when tested on the anvil of above analysis cannot be faulted with as would warrant an indulgence. Consequently, petitions fail and are dismissed. However no costs''.

(8). *In the instant case also, we find that the applicant was working as Office Assistant under the respondent-department and the negligence alleged on her part was that she had not presented a particular letter in time to higher authorities, which resulted in delay in taking action on it and, therefore, penalty of recovery of a huge amount of Rs.2,88,000/- was imposed, without conducting a full-fledged enquiry. Since the pecuniary loss of Rs.2,88,000/- proposed to be recovered exceeds the monetary equivalent of increments for a period of three years, the respondents were required to conduct a full-fledged regular enquiry, as has been held in the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matters of Ajay Agrawal (supra) which has not been done in her case. Thus, the present case is fully governed by the said decision of the Hon'ble High Court and is, therefore, liable to be allowed.*

(9). *Accordingly, the present Original Application is allowed. The impugned orders are quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to refund back the amount so recovered from the applicant, within a period of 60 (sixty) days from the date of communication of this order. However, the applicant shall not be entitled for any interest on the said amount. The respondents are, however, at liberty to proceed in accordance with law. No costs.*

9. In the instant case also, a penalty of recovery of amount of Rs.1,75,703.50 was imposed on the applicant without conducting a full-fledged enquiry. Since the pecuniary loss of Rs.1,75,703.50 recovered from him exceeded the monetary equivalent of increments for a period of three years, the respondents were required to conduct a full-fledged regular enquiry, as has been held in the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matters of **Ajay Agrawal** (supra) which has not been done in his case. Thus, the present case is fully governed by the said decision of the Hon'ble High Court and is, therefore, liable to be allowed.

10. Accordingly, the present Original Application is allowed. The impugned orders dated 19.12.2013 (Annexure A-2) and 30.12.2015 (Annexure A-1) are quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to refund back the amount so recovered from the applicant, within a period of 60 (sixty) days from the date of communication of this order. However, the applicant shall not be entitled for any interest on the said amount. No costs.

(Ramesh Singh Thakur)
Judicial Member

(Navin Tandon)
Administrative Member

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