

IN THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL : HYDERABAD BENCH

AT HYDERABAD

O.A.No.1389/97.

Dt. of Decision : 12-07-99.

Y. Rajasekhara Reddy

..Applicant.

Vs

1. The Director General
Ordnance Factory Board,
10 A, Auckland Road,
Calcutta-700 001.
2. The General Manager,
Ordnance Factory Project,
Yeddumailaram, Medak.

..Respondents.

Counsel for the applicant : Mr.V.Jagapathi

Counsel for the respondents : Mr.B.N.Sharma, Sr.CGSC.

CORAM:-

THE HON'BLE SHRI R.RANGARAJAN : MEMBER (ADMN.)

THE HON'BLE SHRI B.S.JAI PARAMESHWAR : MEMBER (JUDL.)

R

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ORDER

ORAL ORDER (PER HON'BLE SHRI B.S.JAI PARAMESHWAR : MEMBER (J))

Heard Mr.V.Jagapathi, learned counsel for the applicant and Mr.Jacob for Mr.B.N.Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. The applicant in this OA is working as Supervisor (Technical) under the R-2 organisation. On 9-4-93 when he was coming out of the factory at the gate he was subjected to check and the security staff found a double end ring spanner No.12/13 in his scooter.
3. On 17-4-93 the applicant was placed under suspension.
4. He was issued with a charge memo No.02/00058/Estt. dated 27-4-93 with respect to the said incident. The applicant submitted his explanation to the charge memo. A detailed inquiry was conducted into the mis-conduct alleged against the applicant. The inquiry officer submitted his report dated 29-9-93. A copy of the report was furnished to the applicant. The applicant submitted his explanation.
5. After considering the explanation to the enquiry report and the enquiry ^{records} ~~report~~, the disciplinary authority by his proceedings No.02/00058/Estt., dated 30-11-93 (Annexure-4) ~~imposed~~ imposed the penalty of with-holding of increment, when next due, for a period of one year without cumulative effect on the applicant. The suspension of the applicant was also revoked w.e.f., 7-12-93.
6. The Respondent No.2 issued a show cause notice dated 15-1-94 (Annexure-5) seeking his explanation as to why the applicant should be allowed only such pay and allowances as has been admitted to him during the period of suspension and that the said period ^{shall not be treated as} ~~of suspension~~ / period ~~is~~ spent on duty. The



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applicant submitted his representation to the show cause notice. The General Manager by his proceedings dated 5-4-94 (Annexure-6) treated the period of suspension as dies-non.

7. Against the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority the applicant submitted an appeal to the appellate authority.

8. Even before the appellate authority could decide the appeal the applicant approached this Tribunal in OA.1298/94. During the pendency of the OA the appellate authority had decided the appeal but it had not communicated the same to the applicant. After the disposal of the OA the order of the appellate authority dated 6-2-95 was communicated to the applicant on 6-8-97.

9. The applicant has filed this OA challenging the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 30-11-93, the order passed by the appellate authority dated 6-2-95 and the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 5-4-94 in this OA, praying to set aside the same and also to treat the period of suspension as on duty.

10. The respondents have filed their counter stating that instructions were issued earlier to all the factory employees not to bring any private articles inside the factory that it was also stated that such items brought inside the factory should be declared before entering and also before going out of the factory. Further they submit that the applicant was found in possession of double end ring spanner No.12/13 and he had not declared the same at the time of entering the factory on 9-4-93 that the disciplinary authority has taken into consideration the report of the enquiry officer that the appellate authority has considered all the grounds raised by the applicant and passed impugned order dated 6-2-95 and that there are no grounds to set aside the impugned order. Thus they pray for dismissal of the OA.

..4/-



11. The first contention of the applicant is that there were no instructions to the factory employees to not to bring their private articles inside the factory premises. He relied upon the factory order dated 28-5-93 to contend that that order was issued subsequent to the incident. However, the respondents have stated in the reply that orders were in force banning employees from bringing any of the private articles inside the factory by the Factory order Part-I No.186 dated 5-10-90 and also the factory order Part-I No.29 dated 12-2-93. The incident had taken place on 9-4-93. As on that date, the factory order Part-I No.29 dated 12-2-93 was in force. When that is so, the applicant cannot say that the respondent authorities issued the factory order dated 28-05-93 after this incident. Hence this contention is rejected.

12. The applicant submits that the double end ring spanner found in his vehicle was his private property. Even in the OA affidavit he states that he had purchased the double end ring spanner from the market. He should have placed before the enquiry officer the necessary material to substantiate that the spanner was not belonging to the factory and it was his private property. No such evidence produced by him. Even that would not have absolved him as he had failed to declare before entering the factory on 9-4-93.

13. During the course of arguments the learned counsel for the applicant contended that no complaint was made by the factory authorities to the security staff regarding loss of double end ring spanner. ~~It~~ In fact the enquiry officer ascertained that no such complaint was made. However the applicant had failed to establish that the spanner found in his possession was his private property and that he had declared

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at the gate before entering the factory. Further the spanner being a small equipment non-complaint regarding its loss is not a substantive evidence to exonerate the applicant. Because the misconduct was not grave the applicant was awarded a minor penalty.

14. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority has been properly considered by the appellate authority. The material available on record justified the action of the respondents in imposing the punishment on the applicant. We find no reasons to interfere with the punishment imposed by the authorities.

15. Coming to the period of suspension we feel that the applicant was though issued with the major penalty charge memo was punished with a minor penalty. When that is so the respondent authorities should have ^{treated} the period of suspension as on duty. This is in accordance with the DoP O.M.No.11012/15/85/Estt (A) dated 3-12-85. Therefore the respondent authorities were not justified in treating the period of suspension from 17-4-93 to 7-12-93 as dies-non. To that extent the OA is allowed and that the said period shall be treated as on duty.


16. (a) In view of the above the OA is allowed in part.

(b) The order dated 5-4-94 of the respondent No.2 is hereby set aside.

(c) The period of suspension of the applicant from 17-4-93 to 7-12-93 shall be treated as on duty and the consequential monetary and other benefits should be granted to him.

17. No costs.


(B.S. JAI PARAMESHWAR)
MEMBER (JUDL.)


(R. RANGARAJAN)
MEMBER (ADMN.)

Dated : The 12th July, 1999.
(Dictated in the Open Court)

spr

1st AND 11th COURT.

COPY TO:-

1. HDHND

2. HHRP M(A)

3. HDSOP M(J)

4. D.R. (A)

5. SPARE

TYPED BY
COMPARED BY

CHECKED BY
APPROVED BY

THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
HYDERABAD BENCH, HYDERABAD.

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D.H. NASIR
VICE - CHAIRMAN

THE HON'BLE MR. H. RAJENDRA PRASAD
MEMBER (ADMN)

THE HON'BLE MR. R. RANGARAJAN
MEMBER (ADMN)

THE HON'BLE MR. B. S. JAI PARAMESHWAR
MEMBER (JUDL)

ORDER: Date. 12/7/99

~~ORDER~~ / JUDGMENT

MA./RA./CP.NO

IN

DA.NO.

1389/97

ADMITTED AND INTERIM DIRECTIONS
ISSUED.

ALLOWED.

C.P. CLOSED

R.A. CLOSED.

D.A. CLOSED

DISPOSED OF WITH DIRECTIONS


DISMISSED

DISMISSED AS WITHDRAWN

ORDERED / REJECTED

NO ORDER AS TO COSTS.

2 copies



THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO

AND

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN

WRIT PETITION No.719 OF 2000

ORDER: (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice B. Prakash Rao)

The petitioner herein, who has been working as Chargeman Grade-II with the respondents herein, filed this Writ Petition, *inter alia*, seeking to assail the order dated 12.07.1999 in O.A. No.1389 of 1997 on the file of the Central Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad and in turn to set aside the proceedings dated 30.11.1993 and 6.2.1995 imposing punishment in a disciplinary enquiry and also to restore the seniority and grant all the incidental benefits.

The facts, which are necessary for disposal of this case, are that the petitioner was initially appointed as Supervisor, Technical on 21.05.1986 by the second respondent, which is equivalent to that of Chargeman Grade-II in regard to scale of pay. Later on, the said post was merged in the Chargeman Grade-II and in pursuance of the proceedings dated 11.11.1992, he was placed at serial No.73. In the

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22/8/06

DR (C) 22/8/06

SO (E)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH
AT HYDERABAD
(Special Original Jurisdiction)

THURSDAY, THE TWENTY SEVENTH DAY OF JULY
TWO THOUSAND AND SIX

PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO
and
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN

WRIT PETITION NO : 719 of 2000

Between:
Y. Rajasekhar Reddy

..... PETITIONERS

AND

1. The Director General, Ordinance Factory Board, 10-A, Auckland Road, Calcutta-700 001.
2. The General Manager, Ordinance Factory, Project, Yeddumailaram, Medak District.

.....RESPONDENTS


Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to modify the orders passed by Central Administrative Tribunal dated 12.7.1999 by setting aside the order confirming the punishment without cumulative effect and consequently also set aside the proc.No.02/00058/Estt. dated 30.11.1993. and also proc.No.10575/A/VIG, dated 6.2.1995 and direct the respondent to restore the seniority and grant all other benefits including salary, increments and pay and allowances in the interest of justice.

Counsel for the Petitioner : SRI PRATAP NARAYAN SANGHI

Counsel for the Respondents : SRI A. SANJEEV

KUMAR, ADDITIONAL S.C. FOR C.G.

The Court made the following ORDER:



O.A., final orders were passed in appeal. The said O.A. could not be taken up and ultimately the appeal was dismissed on 06.02.1995, which is received by the petitioner on 06.08.1997. Hence, the petitioner filed application in O.A.No.1389 of 1997 challenging these proceedings on various grounds including to the effect that there is absolutely no basis or any evidence or material in support of the charges, which are framed against him nor there is any charge framed or any enquiry conducted on the ultimate finding given against him. However, the Tribunal did not find favour with any of these and other points raised on behalf of the petitioner on merits except to the extent of granting relief treating the period of suspension from 17.04.1993 to 07.12.1993 as on duty instead of as *dies-non*. However, the order imposing penalty being only that of minor one, it was not interfered with. The net result of the orders of the Tribunal is to the effect that the only order dated 05.04.1994 is set aside. Hence, this Writ Petition.

The main submission made on behalf of the petitioner by the learned counsel Sri Pratap Narayan Sanghi is to the effect that having regard to the nature of charges laid against the petitioner and the purport

meanwhile, the petitioner was suspended on 17.04.1993 and a charge memo was issued on 27.04.1993. In view of the same, the petitioner was not granted the benefit of transfer as Chargeman Grade-II. A report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 29.09.1993. According to the petitioner, the enquiry was conducted without notice and opportunity to him. Basing on the said report and after passing or the order by the disciplinary authority dated 30.11.1993, the authorities have imposed a penalty of withholding one increment for one year without cumulative effect and the suspension of the petitioner was revoked with effect from 07.12.1993. On 15.01.1994, the second respondent issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner seeking explanation as to why he should be allowed only such pay and allowances as admitted to him during the period of suspension and the said period was not treated as 'period suspension duty.' The petitioner submitted his explanation. However, as per the orders dated 05.04.1994, the respondents treated the period of suspension as *dies-non*. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged these proceedings in appeal and earlier the petitioner has also filed O.A.No.1298 of 1994 challenging the initial action. Since during the pendency of that

facts and circumstances, the impugned action of imposing the penalty though a minor one is liable to be set aside ?

There is no dispute in regard to the chequered events, which ultimately led to filing of the proceedings before the Tribunal as well as this Court in this Writ Petition. At the relevant point of time, the petitioner was working as Supervisor, Technical, the said post was merged in the Chargeman Grade-II. The complaint of the petitioner is against the non-granting of the benefit of transfer as Chargeman Grade -II even-though no proceedings were pending against him as on the date of DPC. The contents of the charge memo which was served on him on 27.04.1993 read follows:

1. Attempted theft of Government material
2. Failure to maintain absolute integrity
3. Conduct unbecoming of a Government servant

However, the case of the petitioner is to the effect that the said article involved, in fact, belongs to him but not to the respondents. Ultimately in the enquiry, the proceedings virtually took a different turn since it was found that the article does not belong to the respondents and that the petitioner ought not to have brought any such article belonging to

of the allegations as contained therein, there is neither any basis, nor any evidence and material much less a finding. The finding against which the petitioner was holding responsible and guilty for which the penalty was imposed is totally a different one and for which, neither there was any charge nor any enquiry much less any sort of opportunity was given to the petitioner. Hence, the entire impugned action is liable to be set aside.

Sri Andapali .Sanjeev Kumar, the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents sought to sustain the impugned action on the ground that even in regard to the possession of article with the petitioner inside the premises, there is no proper explanation forthcoming and the penalty imposed being only a minor which is totally commensurate to the gravity of the allegation attributed. Hence, neither the initial action taken by the competent authority nor the orders of the Tribunal are liable to be set aside.

Taking into consideration the rival submissions as made across the Bar from both the sides and on perusal of the material available on record, the point which arises for consideration is as to whether, on the

Regulations concerned applicable and more so having regard to the very minor penalty imposed, no interference is warranted. However, the fact remains that even on a bare reading of the aforesaid charges as initially framed and on the face of which the entire enquiry was conducted even taking recourse to the suspension of the petitioner on such allegations, there is no material nor any pointer in respect of any property or material pertaining to the respondent. There is no dispute at any stage of the proceedings including in this Court to the fact that the said spanner belongs to the petitioner but not to that of the respondents herein. The end result of the events is only a lapse on the part of the petitioner in not declaring the said article at the entry point and possessing the same inside the premises. On a reading of the entire proceedings including the charge-sheet and the disciplinary action taken, there is absolutely no whisper nor any point is raised specifically against the petitioner in respect of such allegation that he was possessing an un-declared property and therefore, why action should not be taken nor there was any charge at any point of time framed against the petitioner and thus, there was no enquiry at all on such charge framed. It is a clear case where there is

him without declaring the same at the entry point. Thereupon, the Enquiry Officer proceeded on the ground that there is lacuna in the security procedure and though no pecuniary gain can be achieved by the petitioner but possessing un-declared property would amount to theft of Government material whether it was un-intentional or intentional and held that the petitioner was guilty of the aforesaid three charges. These findings ultimately stood confirmed in the impugned orders in-house appeal and also by the Tribunal. A plea was raised specifically that there being no such complaint of what-so-ever nature in regard to the loss of any material including the one involved double end ring spanner, which was found in his possession, was a private property, mere non-declaration would not amount to theft nor would give parameters of the charge against him. However, the Tribunal found that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was based on the material available on record and is a justified one. Now, an attempt is made on behalf of the respondents herein to show that though the charge was of a theft, but ultimately turned to that it was possession of an un-declared property though belonging to him, which is also in violation of the Rules and the

In **M.V. BIJLANI vs. UNION OF INDIA**¹, considering almost in similar circumstances where there was variance in regard to the charge and ultimate finding, it was held that :

"From a perusal of the enquiry report, it appears to us that the disciplinary authorities proceeded on a wrong premise. The appellant was principally charged for non-maintenance of ACE-8 Register. He was not charged for theft or misappropriation of 4000 kg of telegraph copper wire or misutilisation thereof. If he was to be proceeded against for misutilisation or misappropriation of the said amount of copper wire, it was necessary for the disciplinary authority to frame appropriate charges in that behalf. Charges were said to have been framed after receipt of a report from CBI (Anti-Corruption Bureau). It was, therefore, expected that definite charges of misutilisation/misappropriation of copper wire by the appellant would have been framed. The appellant, therefore, should have been charged for defalcation or misutilisation of the stores he had handled if he was to be departmentally proceeded against on that basis. The second charge shows that he had merely failed to supervise the working of the line. There was no charge that he failed to account for the copper wire over which he had physical control.

It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e., beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analyzing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with.

The report of the enquiry officer suffers from the aforementioned vices. The orders of the disciplinary authority as also the Appellate Authority which are based on the said enquiry report,

¹ (2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 88

total variance in regard to the initial charges and the ultimate conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. There is no finding that there was theft of any Government material nor any finding on the consequent two charges which have been framed initially about the absolute integrity or conduct unbecoming of a Government servant. Even on the finding as arrived at possessing the un-declared property, nothing as such can be attributed against the petitioner that any malice or cast any shadow either on the integrity or conduct of the petitioner. No-doubt, the petitioner ought to have declared the same at the entry point about any such article possessed by him. But mere possession of such article though is not supposed to do as per the Rules, however, as long as it has no nexus to any use or mis-use to the detriment or interest of the respondents-Management and ultimately resulting loss or damage to the respondents, it cannot be said that there is either any theft or theft with any intention that would reflect on the character. Therefore, *prima facie*, we are of the view that the petitioner has been mulcted against a finding or allegation for which neither there was any charge nor any enquiry or there was any sort of opportunity to the petitioner to rebut in the manner known to law.

H.C. 11/2006
(Reverse)

HIGH COURT

DATED: 27.7.2006

Order

WP 719 of 2000

Allowing the W.P.
Without costs.

O A 1389/1997
28/10/06
30/8

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9/5/18-8-06

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G.A.

thus, cannot be sustained. We have also noticed the way in which the Tribunal has dealt with the matter. Upon its findings, the High Court also commented that it had not delved deep into the contentions raised by the appellant. The Tribunal also, thus, failed to discharge its functions properly."

Having regard to the aforesaid principles in support, we are no other option but to hold that the entire proceedings since inception and culminating into the imposition of punishment be it a minor or otherwise under the impugned orders dated 13.11.1993 and also 06.02.1995 are totally bad and consequently liable to be set aside. Further, since these aspects were not considered in proper perspective by the Tribunal, the order of the Tribunal dated 12.07.1999 is also liable to be set aside.

The Writ Petition is, accordingly, allowed and the O.A.No.1389 of 1997 stands allowed and the impugned orders dated 13.11.1993 and 06.02.1995 are set aside. No costs.

That Rule Nisi has been made absolute as above.
Witness the Hon'ble Sri G.S.Singhvi, the Chief Justice on this Thursday the Twenty Seventh day of July, Two Thousand and Six.

Sd/- T. GURUNATH
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

// TRUE COPY //

SECTION OFFICER

To

1. The Director General, Ordinance Factory Board, 10-A, Auckland Road, Calcutta-700 001.
2. The General Manager, Ordinance Factory, Project, Yeddumailaram, Medak District.
3. One CC to Sri A.Sanjeev Kumar, Advocate (OPUC).
4. One CC to Sri Pratap Narayan Sanghi, Advocate (OPUC).
5. Two C.D. Copies.
6. Copy to the Registrar, Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad.

RK

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL HYDERABAD BENCH AT HYDERABAD.
1st Floor, HACA Bhavan, Opp:Public Garden, Hyderabad-500004.A.P.

ORIGINAL APPLICATION NO. **1389.** OF 1997.

Applicant(s)

Y.Rajasekhara Reddy.

By Advocate Shri: **V.Jagapathi.**

To.

V/S:

Respondent(s)

**The Director General, Ordnance
Factory Board, Calcutta.&another.**

(By/Central Govt.Standing Counsel)

Mr.K.Bhaskara Rao.Addl.CGSC.

- ✓ 1. **The Director-General, Ordnance Factory Board,
10 A, Auckland Road, Calcutta.700001.**
- ✓ 2. **The General Manager, Ordnance Factory Project, Veddumailaram,
Medak.**

Whereas an application filed by the above named applicant under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 as in the copy annexed hereunto has been registered and upon preliminary hearing the Tribunal has admitted the application.


Notice is hereby given to you that if you wish to contest the application, you may file your reply along with the document in support thereof and after serving copy of the same on the applicant or his Legal Practitioner within 30 days of receipt of the notice before this Tribunal, either in person or through a Legal Practitioner/ Presenting Officer appointed by you in this behalf. In default, the said application may be heard and decided in your absence on or after that date without any further Notice.

Issued under my hand and the seal of the Tribunal
This the **.Twenty Second,** day of **.October,** 1997.

//BY ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL//

Date **24-10-97.**

FOR REGISTRAR.



27/10/97

S. R. No.


MEDAK

District

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD

OA WR No.

of 1997.



VAKALAT

ACCEPTED

Jagapathi
6-10-97
Reddy
6-10-97

Counsel for Petitioner

Dated 6-10-1997

M/s. V. JAGAPATHI

N.R. REDDY

M.C. ACHARYULU

Counsel for Petitioner

Address for Service :

Phones : (O) 593374
(R) 246180

Twin City Market Complex,
II Floor, Room No. 11,
J.N. Road, Abids, Hyderabad-500 001.

OR

The Advocates Association
High Court Buildings,
Hyderabad-500 266.

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
SPECIAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

OA No. 1389

of 1997.

Between

Y. RAJASEKHARA REDDY

Petitioner

AND

The Director General, Ordnance Factory Board,
10 A, Auckland Road, Calcutta-700 001 & another.

I Y. Rajasekhara Reddy S/o Y. Chandrasekhara Reddy, Respondent

aged about 33 years, Supervisor (Tech), Ordnance Factory Project,
Yeddumailaram, Medak District.

PETITIONER

RESPONDENT

In the above Application do hereby appoint and retain

M/s. V. JAGAPATHI

N. R. REDDY &

M.C. ACHARYULU

Advocates of the High Court to appear for ME/US in the above APPEAL/PETITION and to conduct and prosecute (or defend) the same and all proceedings that may be taken in respect of any application connected with the same or any decree or order passed therein including all applications for return of documents or the receipt of any moneys that may be payable to ME/US in the said Appeal/Petition and also to appear in all applications under Clause XV of the Letters patent and in all applications for review and for leave to the Supreme Court of India and in all applications for review of Judgment.



[Signature]

(Y. RAJASEKHARA REDDY)

I certify that the contents of this Vakalat were read out and explained in (.....Telugu.....) in my presence to the executants who appeared perfectly to understand the same and made his / her / their signatures or mark in my presence.

Executed before me this.....5th.....day of Oct.....1997

[Signature]
Advocate, Hyderabad



Central Administrative Tribunal
Hyderabad Bench, Hyderabad.

O A / B A No. 1389 of 1997

MEMO OF APPEARANCE

Basculis

MSA BHASKARA RAO
ADVOCATE

Addl. Standing Counsel for Central Govt

Counsel for *Respondents*

Address for Service:

Phone : 7636003

H. No. 1-2-33/2 Dampalaguda
HYDERABAD - 500 029

(81)

Central Adminis

ibunal, Hyderabad Bench,
ABAD.

OA/BA No.

1389 of 1997

BETWEEN

y, Rajasekhara Reddy

Applicant (s)


Vs.

*The D.G.O.F.,
Ordinance factory Board
calcutta*

Respondent (s)

MEMO OF APPEARANCE

To,



K. BHASKARA RAO, Advocate, having been authorised *The General Manager,
Ordinance factory project, yeddu mailavaram*
(here furnish the particulars of authority)
by the Central/State Government/Government Servant/.....authority/ corporation/society noti-
fied under Sec. 14 of the Administrative Tribunals. Act, 1985. Hereby appear for applicant No.....
Respondent No. *AM* and undertake to plead and act for them in all matters in the afore-
said case.

Place : Hyderabad.

Date : *10-12-97*

Address of the Counsel for Service

*BHASKARA RAO
102-353/2 Donalaguda
HYDERABAD - 500 039*

Bhaskara Rao

Signature & Designation of the
Counsel.

KOTA BHASKARA RAO

Addl. Standing Counsel for Central Govt.