IN THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL : HYDERABAD BENCH

AT HYDERABAD

O.A.No. 219/97 Date of Order : 28.4.99

BETWEEN :

T.Narayana Rao .. Applicant

AND

1. The Controller & Auditor General of India, 10, Bahadur Shah Jafar Marg, New Delhi.

2. The Dy.Controller & A uditor , General of India, Bahadur Shah Jaffar Marg, New Delhi.

3. The Principal Director of Commercial Audit and Ex-Office Member, Audit Board, AG's Office, Complex, Saifabad, Hyderabad.

4. The Principal Accountant General, (A udit-I), A.P., Hyderabad. .: Respondents.

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Counsel for the Applicant .. Mr.V.VenkateswaraRa

Counsel for the Respondents .. Mr.J.R.GopalaRao

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CORAM :

HON'BLE SHRI R.RANGARAJAN : M EMBER (ADMN.)

HON'BLE SHRI B.S. JAI PARAMESHWAR : MEMBER (JUDL.)

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ORDER

X As per Hon'ble Shri B.S.Jai Parameshwar, Member(JUdl.) X

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Mr.V.Venkateswara Rao, learned counsel for the applicant and Ms.Shakthi for Mr.J.R.Gopala Rao, learned standing counsel for the respondents. The learned counsel for the applicant has submitted written arguments, perused the same.

2. During the year 1978-79 the applicant was working as the Section Officer in the office of R-4. At that time he was one of the members of the Executive Committee of M/s The Civil Accounts and Audit Association - a Service A ssociation of the employees working in the office of the Respondent No.4.

3. Between October 1978 and March 1979 the A ssociation had held demonstrations, Gherao and strike etc., to press the long pending demands of the members of the Association. The Association by its notice dated 25.11.78 had informed the respondent authorities of its resolve to launch "Relay Hunger Strike" between 27.11.78 (8.00 AM) to 2.12.78 (5.00 PM).

4. The applicant was sanctioned a days' casual leave on 29.11.78. The applicant participated in the relay hunger strike on 29.11.78.

5. As a sequal to the relay hunger strike demonstrated by the association and its Executive Committee Members, the respondents larged a complaint with the local police and issued orders placing them under suspension.

6. The applicant challenged the order of suspension before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P. in W.P.No.2283/80. He was reinstated into service w.e.f. 21.5.80.

7. The respondents initiated the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant and others. The applicant was issued with a charge memos dated 21.9.79 and 15.10.79. The applicant and others challenged the charge memos before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P. in W.P.No.2665/82 on the plea that they were not governed by the provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965. The Hon'ble High Court of A.P. stayed further proceedings in the disciplinary proceedings by its order dated 12.4.82. The Hon'ble High Court accepted the plea of the applicant and others and allowed the Writ Petition. The respondents filed S.L.P. before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and got the operation of the judgement of the High Court stayed by an interim order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the respondents to conclude the disciplinary proceedings, however not to pass any final orders on the charge memos.

8. The applicant participated in the disciplinary proceedings. 8(a) The enquiry officer held misconduct alleged against the applicant in the charge memos dated 15.10.79 has not proved vide his report dated 8.3.91.

9. With regard to the charge dated 21.9.79 the enquiry officer recorded his findings as follows :-

> Article-I not proved but held that the allegations that the applicant had participated in the relay hunger strike on 29.11.78 has proved.

10. The report of the enquiry officer is dated 28.3.91/ 25.11.91.

11. A copy of the report of the enquiry officer was furnished to the applicant. The applicant submitted his representation dated 20.3.96.

12. An adhoc disciplinary authority considered the representation of the applicant, report of the enquiry officer and the connected records. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and by its proceedings No.MAB/DCA/13/3/95-96/Vol.II/302 dated 9.4.96 imposed the punishment of withholding 3 increments for a period of one year without cumulative effect. The order of the disciplinary authority is dated 9.4.96. It is at Annexure-4 to the OA.

13. The applicant submitted an appeal dated 16.4.96 to the Deputy Controller and Auditor General of India i.e. R-2. A copy of the appeal memo is at Annexure-5. The R-2 considered the appeal and by his order dated 22.1.96 reduced the penalty to that of withholding one increment for a period of one year without cumulative effect.

14. The applicant has filed this OA for the following reliefs :

To call for the records pertaining to the order No. DCA-13-3/95-96/Vol.II/302 dated 9.4.96 issued by the Respondent No.3 and order dated 22.1.97 of the Respondent No.2 as communicated vide Lr.No.MAB/DCA/13-3/95-96/Vol.III/347 dated 6.2.97 by the 3rd respondent and quash the same declaring it as illegal, arbitrary, malafide, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India by holding that the applicant is entitled for all consequential benefits such as arrears of pay and allowances, grant of increments.

15. The applicant has challenged the impugned orders on the following grounds :-

(a) The impugned orders are issued to cow down the Association activities, as the action of the applicant was in the capacity of the member of the Executive Committee of the Association.

(b) The impugned orders are illegal, arbitrary and malafide.

malafide.

(c) There was no justification for constituting an adhoc disciplinary authority as the regular disciplinary authority was not cited as a witness in the enquiry proceedings.

(d) There was no strike call nor strike was there on 29.11.78 in the office of R-4.

(e) He was sanctioned leave on 29.11.78. He was on fast from 9.00AM to 5.30 PM on 29.11.78. He observed the fast outside the office premises.

(f) Treating an official who was sanctioned leave as on strike is malafide.

(g) There should be stoppage of work or retordation of work and the like, to attract note below Rule 7 of the CCS(CCA) Rules 1965 with which he was charged.

(h) He was reverted to a post lower in grade without any notice.

(i) The member of the Executive Committee of the Association who were admittedly participated in the relay hunger strike were let off without any kind of punishment and the Chief Executive of the Association was allowed to retire from service without any punishment, whatsoever

(j) The respondents authorities deliberately took action against himself and the applicant in OA.996/97 (IVSRK.Sharma) discrimination and victimisation.

(k) No evidence was led in the enquiry.

(l) The enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the rules and the R-2 was failed to apply his mind to various contentions raised by him in the appeal.

16. The respondents have filed their reply contending that the Casual Leave sanctioned to the applicant for 29.11.78 was subject to the condition that he should not participate in the demonstration commenced from 27.11.78.

17. The applicant participated in the relay hunger strike on 29.11.78.

18. Participation in any kind of strike is violative of rule of the Conduct Rules.

19. During the pendency of the enquiry the case of the applicant came up for consideration for promotion as A.O. before the DPC. The DPC kept its recommendations in a sealed cover. The applicant approached the Hon'ble High Court of A.P. in W.P.10485/84. On 17.10.85 the Hon'ble High Court directed the respondents to consider the case of the applicant for promotion without reference to the disciplinary proceedings, that in case the disciplinary proceedings went against him it would be open to the respondent authorities to review the promotion. That accordingly the applicant was promoted as A.A.O. w.e.f. 1.3.84 subject to the outcome of the disciplinary case pending in the High Court/Supreme Court.

20. After the disposal of the SLP C.A.No.4047-48/89 the disciplinary authority considered the enquiry records and imposed the penalty. On account of this penalty the Respondent No.4 reviewed the promotion in accordance with the order dated 17.10.85 of the Hon'ble High Court of A.P.

21. The applicant cannot compare his case with the other members of the Executive Committee of the Association.

22. As the applicant participated in the relay hunger strike the leave sanctioned to him earlier was later cancelled, and.

23. The impugned orders are valid and according to law.

24. The main contention raised by the applicant is that on 29.11.78 he had obtained leave of absence from the competent authority that he had participated in the relay hunger strike that the relay hunger strike had not caused any distrubance, obstruction or retordation of the work in the office of R-4. That relay hunger strike was demonstrated at outside the office premises. That relay hunger strike cannot be considered as strike affecting the normal work in the office of the Respondent No.4. That the said relay hunger strike was a peaceful demonstration. That the respondents were not justified as a misconduct. That the respondent authorities had subsequently cancelled the leave sanctioned to him to penalise him, that other members of

the Executive Committee were let off without any punishment that the respondent authorities have singled him and I.V.S.R.K. Sharma (applicant in OA.996/97) that the Chief Executive of the Association was allowed to retire without any kind of punishment. That the action of the respondents thus amounted to discrimination and victimisation.

25. The applicant has challenged his reversion. The respondents submit that reversion was necessitated on account of inflicting punishment on him in accordance with the directions of the Hon'ble High Court dated 17.10.85. The said reversion cannot be considered in this OA.

26. The learned counsel for the applicant in support of his contention that participation in the relay hunger strike does not amount to misconduct or strike has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of O.K. Ghosh and another v. E.X.Joseph. In paras 8 to 12 the Lordships have observed as follows:-

> "The question about the validity of R.4-A has been the subject-matter of a recent decision of this Court in Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 1166. At the hearing of the said appeal, the appellants and the respondent had intervened and were heard by the Court. In that case, this Court has held that R. 4-A in the form in which it now stands prohibiting any form of demonstration is violative of the Government servants' rights under Art.19(1)(a)&(b) and should, therefore, be struck down. In striking down the rule in this limited way, this Court made it clear that in so

far as the said rule prohibits a strike, it cannot be struck down for the reason that there is no fundamental right to resort to a strike. In otherwords, if the rule was invalid against a Government servant on the ground that he had resorted to any form of strike specified by R. 4-A, the Government servant would not be able to contend that the rule was invalid in that behalf. In view of this decision, we must hold that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that R.4-A was valid as a whole.

That takes us to the question about the validity of R.4-B. The High Court has held that the impugned rule contravenes the fundamental right guaranteed to the respondent by Art.19(1)(c). The respondent along with other Central Government servants is entitled to form association or unions and in so far as this right is prejudicially controlled and adversely affected by the impugned Solicitor-General contends that in deciding the question about the validity of the rule, we will have to take into account the provision of cl.(4)in Art. 19. This clause provides that Art.19(1)(c) will not affect the operation of any existing law in to far as it imposes, in the interests of public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. The argument is that the impugned rule does nothing more than imposing a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right which is alleged to have been contravened and, therefore, the provision of the rule is saved by cl.(4).

This argument raises the problem of construction of cl.(4). Can it be said that the rule imposes a reasonable restriction in the interests of public order? There can be no doubt that Government servants can be subjected to rule which are intended to maintain discipline amongst their ranks and to lead to an efficient discharge of their duties. Discipline amongst Government employees and their efficiency may in a sense, be said to be related to public order. But in considering the scope of cl.(4), it has to be borne in mind that the rule must be in

the interests of public order and must amount to a reasonable restriction. The words "Public order" occur even in cl.(2), which refers, inter alia, to security of the State and public order. There can be no doubt that the said words must have the same meaning in both cls.(2) and (4). So far as cl.(2) is concerned, security of the State having been expressly and specifically provided for, public order cannot include the security of State, though in its widest sense it may be capable of including the said concept. Therefore in cl.(2), public order is virtually synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility. The denotation of the said words cannot be any wider in cl.(4). That is one consideration which it is necessary to bear in mind. When cl.(4) refers to the restriction imposed in the interests of public order, it is necessary to enquire as to what is the effect of the words "in the interests of". This clause again cannot be interpreted to mean that even if the connection between the restriction and the public order is remote and indirect restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order. A restriction can be said to be in the interests of public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order is proximate and direct. Indirect or far-fetched or unreal connection between the restriction and public order would not fall within the perview of the expression "in the interest of public order". The inter pretation is strengthened by the other requirement of cl.(4) that, by itself, the restriction ought to be responsible. It would be difficult to hold that a restriction which does not directly relate to public order can be said to be resposible on the ground that its connection if public order is remote or far-fetched. That is another consideration which is relevant. Therefore, reading the two requirements of cl.(4), it follows that the impugned restriction can be said to satisfy the test of cl.(4) only if it is connection with public order is shown to be rationally proximate and direct. That is the view taken by this Court in Superintendent, Central

Prison, Pathgarh v. Dr.Ram Manohar Lohia AIR 1960 SC 633. In the words of Pantanjali Sastri J. in theRex v. Basudev, 1949 FCR 657 at page 661 , (AIR 1950 FC 67 at p.69) "the connection contemplate between the restriction and the public order must be real and proximate, not far-fetched or problamatical ". It is in the light of this legal position that the validity of the impugned rule must be determined.

It is not disputed that the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art.19 can be claimed by Government servants. Art.33 which confers powers on the Parliament to modify the rights in their application to the Armed Forces, clearly brings out the fact that all citizens, including Govt. servants, are entitled to claim the rights guaranteed by Art.19. Thus, the validity of impugned rule has to be judged on the basis that the respondent and his co-employees are entitled to form associations or unions. It is clear that R.4-(B), imposes a restriction on his right. It virtually compels a Government servant to withdraw his membership of the service association of Government servants as soon as recognisition accorded to the said association is withdrawn or if, after assodiation is formed, no recognisition is accorded to it within six months. In otherwords, the right to form an association is conditioned by the existence of recognisition of the said association by the Government. If the Association obtains the recognition and continues to enjoy it. Government servants can become members of said association; if the association does not secure recognition from the Government, or recognition granted to it is withdrawn, Government servant must cease to be the members of the said association. That is the plain effect of the impugned rule. Can this restriction can be said to be in the interest of public order and can it be said to be a reasonable restriction? In our opinion, the only answer to these questions would be in the negative. It is difficult to see any direct approximate or reasonable connection between the recognition by the Government of the association and the discipline amongst and the efficiency of, the members of the

said association. Similarly, it is difficult to see any connection between recognition and public order.

A reference to R.5 of the recognition of service Association Rules recently made in 1959 would clearly show that there is no necessary connection between recognition or its withdrawal and public order. Rule 5 enumerates different conditions by cls. (a) to (1) which every service Association must comply with ; and R.7 provides that if a Service Association recognised under the said rules has failed to comply with the condition set out in Rr.4, 5 or 6, its recognition may be withdrawn. One of the conditions imposed by R.5 (1) is that communications addressed by the Service Association or by the office bearer on his behalf to the Government or a Government authority shall not contain any disrespectable or improper language. Similarly, R.5 (g) provides that previous permission of the Government shall be taken before the Service Association seeks affiliation with any other union, service association or federation; and R.5 (h) prohibits the Service Association from starting or publishing any periodical magazine or bulletin without the previous approval of the Government. It is not easy to see any rational, direct or proximate connection between the observance of those conditions and public order. Therefore, without examining the validity of the conditions laid down by Rr.4,5 or 6 , it is not difficult to hold that the granting or withdrawing of recognition may be based on considerations some of which have no connection whatever either efficiency or discipline amongst the services or if public order. It might perhaps have been a different matter. If the recognition or its withdrawal had been based on grounds which have a direct, proximate and rational connection with public order. That, however, cannot be said about each one of conditions prescribed by Rr.4,5 or 6. Therefore, it is quite possible that recognition may be refused or withdrawn on grounds which are wholly unconnected with public order and it is in such a set up that the right to form associations guaranteed by Art.19 (i) (c) is made subject to the

rigorious restriction that the association in question must secure and continue to enjoy recognition from the Government. We are, therefore, satisfied thatthe restriction thus imposed would make the guaranteed right under Art.19 (1) (c) in effective and even illusory. That is why we see no reason to differ from the conclusion of the High Court that the impugned Rr.44B is invalid. In the result, appeal No. 378/1962 fails and is dismissed".

27. Further the learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad in the case of Suraj Prasad v. Northern Railway (reported in AIR 1967 All. 457. In paras 4 to 7 the Hon'ble High Court considered where the participation in peaceful strike before it was banned by the maintenance service was legal or not. Paras 4 to 7 are relevant and are reproduced herein below :-

"All that we are left with therefore is the question of whether the petitioners action in urging railway employees to join the general strikeand organising a procession in favour of that strike would infringe rule 3 of the Railway Service (Conduct) Rules. Mr.Jagadish Swarup contends that the "devotion to duty" required by this rule precludes a railway servant from going on strike or inciting other railway servants to go on strike In this connection he was relied on the dictum of the Supreme Court in Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166 that there is no fundamental right to resort to a strike. But neither is there anything inherently illegal in a strike; and Mr.Jagdish Swarup has not been able to show me any specific provision in any

statute or rule that would prohibit strikes by railway employees. Indeed section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 clearly envisages strike by persons employed in a "public utility service" given in section 2(n) of the Act.

It has been urged that the petitioner is not a workman as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act and is therefore not entitled to claim the benefit of its provisions: but the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of railway employees would be covered by the Act and consequently rule 3 of the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules cannot possibly be construed as precluding railway servants from resorting to strikes (subject of course to such restrictions as have been imposed by section 22 of the Act) The strike that the petitioner was helping to organise seems to have been timed to begin on the expiry of the period of notice required by law and there is nothing to suggest that that strike was in any way illegal until 8.7.1960, when it was banned by the order promulgated by the Government under the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance. On 4.7.1960, when the petitioner incited his fellow employees to go on strike, and on 7.7.1960, when he organised the procession in favour of the strike, that strike was not illegal; and I am unable to accept the contention of Mr.Jagadish Swarup that the acts performed by the petitioner on those dates amounted to any deviation from the "devotion to duty" required by rule 3 of the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules.

As laid down by the Supreme Court in Kameshwar Prasad's case AIR 1962 SC 1166 (supra) peaceful and orderly demonstration intended to convey to the employer the feelings of the employees would fall within the freedoms guaranteed under dauses (a) and (b) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution; and consequently the petitioner and other railway employees were fully entitled to hold meetings and organise processions in furtherance of their proposed strike on 4.7.1960 and 7.7.1960 (before the ban was

introduced by the order promulgated under the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance on 8.7.1960), without thereby being guilty of any dereliction of duty or any infringement of rule 3 of the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules.

I am satisfied therefore that the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any breach either of rule 3 or rule 6(1) of the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules. It follows that he could not be held guilty of 'gross misconduct' (or indeed of any misconduct) and his dismissal was clearly illegal.

Mr. Jagadish Swarup has attempted to argue that even if the petitioner's dismissal is found to violate the departmental Rules applicable to railway employees, he still cannot claim any redress from this court, because under Article 310 ofthe Constitution he must be deemed to hold office 'during the pleasure of the President'. In this connection reliance is placed on the decision of the decision of a learned single Judge of this court in Jagannath Singh v. Assistant Excise Commissioner AIR 1959 All. 771, in which it was held that on account of the provisions of Article 310, the mere breach of statutory departmental rules would not be sufficient to vitiate an order for the dismissal of a Government servant to seek redress from the courts. But in view of the subsequent pronouncements of the Supreme Court, that decision can no longer be accepted as enunciating correct law.

The legal position of Government servants with reference to Article 310 of the Constitution has been elaborately discussed in State of U.P. v. Baburam Upadhaya AIR 1961 SC 751 in which it has been laid down inter alia that though every member of a public service described in Article 310 holds office during the pleasure of the President or the Governor as the case may be the power to dismiss a

public servant at pleasure is outside the scope of Article 154 and therefore cannot be delegated by the President or Governor to subordinate officer. The majority judgement in that case observes:-

"A law made by the appropriate legislature or the rules made by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, under the said Article (i.e. Article 309) may confirm a power on a particular to remove a public servant from service. But the conferment of such a power does not amount to a delegation of the Governor's pleasure. Whatever the said authority does is by virtue of express powers conferred on it by a statute or rules made by contempt authorities, and not by virtue of any delegation by the Governor of his power".

In the present case the order dismissing the petitioner has been passed by an officer empowered to pass such an order under the rules incorporated in the railway establishment code andhis order must be in accordance with those rules he could not dismiss the petitioner in exercise of the powers to dismiss a public servant at pleasure. Since that is a power that resides only in the President or Governor under Article 310 and cannot be delegated. Article 310 is thus totally irrelevant for the purposes of the present petition and cannot be treated as creating any bar to the issue of a Writ quashing the dismissal order passed by the Divisional Superintendent. In this connection it may be noted that in State of Mysore v. M.H.Bellary, AIR 1965 SC 1868 the Supreme Court, relying on the earlier decision in Baburam Upadhaya's case AIR 1961 SC 751 has specifically laid down that if there is the breach of a statutory rule relating to conditions of service, the aggrieved Government servant can have recourse to the Court for redress".

28. Further the applicant also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar (reported in AIR 1962 SC 1170). Para-13 is relevant and the same is reproduced below :-

> " The first question that falls to be considered is whether the right to make a "demonstration is covered by either or both of the two freedoms guaranteed by Art.19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b). A "demonstration" is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as "an outward exhibition of feeling, as an exhibition of opinion on political or other question especially a public meeting or procession". In Webster it is defined as "a .....as by a parade or mass-meeting".Without going very much into the niceties of language it might be broadly stated that a demonstration is a visible manifestation of the feelings or sentiments of an individual or a group. It is thus a communication of one's ideas to others to whom it is intended to be conveyed. It is in effect therefore a form of speech or of expression, because speech need not be vocal since signs made by a dumb person would also be a form of speech. It has however to be recognised that the argument before us is confined to the rule prohibiting demonstration which isa form of speech and expression or of a mere assembly and speeches therein and not other forms of demonstration which do not fall within the content of Art.19(1)(a) or 19(1)(b). A demonstration might take the form of an assembly and even then the intention is to convey to the person or authority to whom the communication is intended the feelings of the group which assembles. It necessarily follows that there are forms of demonstration which would fall within the freedoms guaranteed by Art.19(1)(a) & 19(1)(b). It is needless to add that from the very nature of things a demonstration may take various forms; it may be noisy and disorderly

for instance stone-throwing by a crowd may be cited as an example of a violent and disorderly demonstration and this would not obviously be within Art.19 (1)(a) or (b). It can equally be peaceful and orderly such as happens when the members of the group merely wear some badge drawing attention to their grievances".

29. It is on these grounds the learned counsel for the applicant submits that punishment metted out to the applicant was not warranted. Further the learned counsel for the applicant contended that the respondents authorities allowed the other members of the Executive Committee of the Association to retire or allowed to escape without any kind of punishment.

30. The Court of Tribunal cannot interfere in these matters. Further the appellate authority has not taken into consideration the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Court of Allahabad. However, he has reduced the punishment

31. In that view of the matter we feel it proper to direct the appellate authority i.e. R-2 to reconsider the appeal dated 16.4.96 of the applicant taking into consideration the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the High Court of Allahabad and also the grounds raised by the applicant in the appeal/OA. The R-2 shall also consider the circumstances under which the other Committee Members of the Association were left without any kind of punishment. If there is any justification, the Appellate Authority may take into consideration those circumstances also in directing the appeal.

OR

32. We hope and trust that the R-2 will consider the appeal of the applicant dispassionately and judiciously.

33. Hence we issue the following directions:-

(1) The R-2 shall reconsider the appeal dated 16.4.96 of the applicant in accordance with the law taking due note of the observations made by us as above.

(2) The R-2 shall provide an opportunity of hearing to the applicant if he desires a personal hearing.

(3) The R-2 shall communicate his decisions on reconsideration of the appeal to the applicant though a detailed speaking order.

(4) Time for compliance of (3) above is 3 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

34. With these directions the OA is disposed of. No costs.

(B.S. JAI PARAMESHWAR)
Member (Judl.)

(R.RANGARAJAN)
Member (Admn.)

28/4/99

Dated :28th April,1999

(Dictated in Open Court)

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COPY TO:-

1. HDHNJ
2. HHRP M(A)
3. ~~HBSJP M(J)~~
4. ~~B.R.(A)~~
5. SPARE

IST AND IIND COURT

TYPED BY
COMPARED BY

CHECKED BY
APPROVED BY

THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
HYDERABAD BENCH : HYDERABAD.

THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE D.H.NASIR :
VICE - CHAIRMAN

THE HON'BLE MR. H.RAJENDRA PRASAD :
MEMBER (A)

THE HON'BLE MR.R.RANGARAJAN :
MEMBER (A)

THE HON'BEL MR.B.S.JAI PARAMESWAR:
MEMBER (J)

DATED: 28.4.95

~~ORDER / JUDGEMENT~~

~~M.A./R.A./C.P.No.~~

IN

O.A. No. 219/97

ADMITTED AND INTERIM DIRECTIONS ISSUED.

ALLOWED.

C.P.CLOSED.

R.A./CLOSED.

DISPOSED OF WITH DIRECTIONS

DISMISSED.

DISMISSED AS WITHDRAWN.

ORDERED/REJECTED.

~~NO ORDER AS TO COSTS.~~

SRR

केन्द्रीय प्रशासनिक अधिकरण
Central Administrative Tribunal
डेस्पैच / DESPATCH
12 MAY 1995
हैदराबाद न्यायपीठ
HYDERABAD BENCH