

Central Administrative Tribunal  
Mumbai Bench

O.A. 654/96  
with  
O.A.768/96

Mumbai this the 12th day of October, 2001

Hon'ble Smt. Lakshmi Swaminathan, Vice Chairman(J).  
Hon'ble Shri B.N. Bahadur, Member(A).

O.A.654/96.

Chacko Jacob,  
Ex-Tradesman C,  
BARC, Mumbai,  
R/o C-11, Takshasila,  
Anushaktinagar,  
Mumbai-400 094.

... Applicant.

(By Advocate Shri S. Natrajan)

Versus

1. Union of India through  
Secretary,  
Department of Atomic Energy,  
CSM Marg, Mumbai-400 039.
2. The Chairman,  
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board,  
Vikram Sarbhai Bhavan,  
Anushaktinagar, Mumbai-400 094.
3. Controller,  
BARC, Central Complex,  
Trombay, Mumbai-400 085. ... Respondents.

(By Advocate Shri R.R. Shetty)

O.A.768/96

S. Choudhari,  
residing at B-11/11,  
Sector 6, Vashi,  
Navi Mumbai formerly  
employed as Tradesman 'D'  
in the Reactor Operations  
Division of Bhabha Atomic  
Research Centre,  
MUMBAI-400 085.

... Applicant.

(By Advocate Shri M.S. Ramamurthy)

Versus

1. Union of India through the Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, CSM Marg, Mumbai-400 085.
2. Head, Personnel Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Government of India, Central Complex, Trombay, Mumbai-400 085.
3. The Controller, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Department of Atomic Energy, Trombay, Mumbai-400 085. .... Respondents.

(By Advocate Shri R.R. Shetty)

O R D E R

Hon'ble Smt. Lakshmi Swaminathan, Vice Chairman (J).

The aforesaid two applications (O.A.654/96 and O.A.768/96) were heard together. At the request of the learned ecounsel, O.A.768/96 was first taken up. Shri S. Natrajan, learned counsel for the applicant in OA 654/96, has submitted that he adopts the arguments of Shri M.S. Ramamurthy, learned counsel for the applicant in O.A.768/96 and has made further submissions wherever necessary in the particular facts of his case.

2. The applicants in the above two cases, while working in the Retractor Operations Division of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)/respondents, were charge-sheeted and the Departmental inquiries were held against them. The respondents have imposed the penalty orders of dismissal from service against the applicants and the appellate authority has also confirmed the

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same which have been impugned in the two applications. The applicant, Shri S. Choudhari in O.A. 768/96, has impugned the disciplinary authority's order dated 25.8.1995 and the appellate authority's order dated 30.4.1996 dismissing his appeal. The applicant, Shri Chacko Jacob in O.A.654/96, has also impugned the dismissal order dated 25.8.1995 and dismissal of his appeal by the appellate authority by order dated 16.2.1996.

3. In O.A.768/96 by Memo dated 4.9.1992, the applicant was issued a charge-sheet with five articles of charges. The Inquiry Officer had found in his report dated 9.1.1995, Articles-I, II and III as proved and Articles-IV and V as not proved. The applicant had made his representation on the Inquiry Officer's report. The disciplinary authority in the impugned order dated 25.8.1995 had disagreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer insofar as Articles-IV and V were concerned and held that Article-IV was also proved on the basis of the reasoning given by him in the order on the evidence led in the Disciplinary proceedings. With regard to the fourth charge, after discussing the evidence, he had come to the conclusion that although he does not agree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, he gives the benefit of doubt to the charged official regarding the applicant's contribution for leaking out ~~the~~ information to the Press. The appellate authority in his order dated 30.4.1996 came to the

conclusion that not only the procedure laid down in the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 has been duly complied with in this case but also the Articles of charges I,II and III were serious enough individually to call for a major penalty independently.

4. Briefly stated, the allegation in Article I of the charge is that the applicant while functioning as Tradesman (D), in the Reactor Operations Division, did not perform the duties allotted to him after signing his attendance register at 0700 hours on 12.6.1992; Article II relates to the allegation that the applicant did not write the Reactor Area Log Book showing the status of the plant which is part of his duties on 4.6.1992 and instead misused the log book to write certain remarks in the form of demands unrelated to his official duties; in Article III, the charge is that the applicant exhorted, instigated and abetted other Plant Operators of Dhruva/CIRUS Reactors on 12.6.1992 to abandon their duty and he along with other Plant Operators deserted their duty place and thus resorted to a form of strike in connection with certain demands pertaining to his services; Article-IV relates to the allegation that the applicant along with a few operators of Dhruva and CIRUS entered the Control Room of CIRUS and shouted and threatened the Engineers on 13.6.1992 and Article-V is on the allegation that he had given misleading information to the Press in June, 1992 without any permission or authorisation.

5. One of the main grounds taken by Shri M.S. Ramamurthy, learned counsel, is that the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the Inquiry Officer's report regarding Articles-IV and V had not followed the procedure of law in recording his reasons for disagreement and giving an opportunity to the applicant to give his reply. He has relied on *Punjab National Bank and Ors. Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra (JT 1998 (5) SC 548)*.

6. The other main ground taken by the learned counsel for the applicant is that even in the case of charges in Articles-I, II and III, this is a case of no evidence. He has submitted that the relied upon document, namely, the "Area Log Book" which is listed at item No. 2 was not produced in the Departmental inquiry. Learned counsel has very vehemently submitted that the register which was produced in the inquiry was a "Register of Complaints" which contains certain entries from ~~3.6.~~<sup>15</sup> 1992 and is not the "Area Log Book" which is another separate book. He has submitted that the "Complaints Book" which was in the Control Room, in which both the applicants had recorded certain complaints of the Union which they represented could at best be termed as misuse of some stationery of the respondents and nothing more, as this register was not the "Area Log Book" which was never produced by the respondents at the inquiry. It is, however, not denied that what the applicants submit is the

"Complaints Register" is also a register placed in the Control Room of the Retractor by the respondents, which they have <sup>is</sup> vehemently submitted is not the "Area Log Book" and merely a "Complaints Register" in which they have recorded the grievances and complaints of members of the Trade Union. It is relevant to note that to our repeated questions during the hearing, learned counsel did not clarify when and how the applicant made a specific representation to the Inquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority to produce, what he calls is the correct "Area Log Book" and not the "Complaints Register". The register which was produced at the time of the inquiry shows entries from 2.6.1992 to 11.6.1992 and, according to the learned counsel, most of the entries relate to grievances of the Union and its demands and from 12.6.1992 the Log Book starts. Learned counsel has emphasised that the applicant had not deserted the duty place on 11.6.1992 but was actually prevented by the authorities from performing his duty of second shift on 11.6.1992. Relying on the daily order sheets of the proceedings held on 12.1.1993 and 13.1.1993 (Exhibits 'K' and 'L' of the paper book), learned counsel has contended that with regard to the allegations in Article-III, this is a case of no evidence as none of the witnesses have testified against the applicant. Learned counsel has submitted that the respondents have, while issuing the impugned orders of dismissal, relied on hearsay evidence of the

Supervisor and other officers who were not sitting in the Retractor Operations Division regarding the absence of the applicant which cannot be relied upon and, therefore, his contention is that this is a case of no evidence. In the circumstances, learned counsel has prayed that the penalty orders may be quashed and set aside with all consequential benefits.

8. We have seen the reply filed by the respondents and heard Shri R.R. Shetty, learned counsel. The respondents have controverted the above submissions made by the applicants. According to them, the inquiry has been held in accordance with the procedure laid down and after compliance with the principles of natural justice and giving the applicant ample opportunities to put forward his case. Learned counsel has submitted that the applicant had been placed under suspension by order dated 13.6.1992. Learned counsel has submitted that the punishment orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority are based on evidence by way of documents and statements of witnesses which were presented at the Departmental <sup>Officer's Report</sup> inquiry. A copy of the Inquiry Report has also been given to the applicant on 24.2.1995. The disciplinary authority, after considering the Inquiry Officer's report, the representation submitted by the applicant and other facts and circumstances of the case held that the charges against the applicant in

Articles-I-IV as proved and gave the benefit of doubt in respect of Article-V. Shri R.R. Shetty, learned counsel has submitted that the appellate authority had also considered the points raised by the applicant in his appeal, including the submission that the disciplinary authority had erred in not communicating his disagreement with the Inquiry Officer in two of the charges while imposing the penalty of dismissal. The appellate authority has held the first three charges as proved and also they were serious enough to warrant the penalty of dismissal from service which has been imposed by the disciplinary authority. In the circumstances, the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal. Learned counsel has emphatically submitted that looking to the nature of the job requirements which the applicant was duty bound to do, while working in the Retractor Operations Division at the relevant time, which was ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> subject matter of charges in Articles-I, II and III, he was awarded the penalty of dismissal from service, which the competent authorities have correctly imposed. He has submitted that even if the disciplinary authority had disagreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer with respect to Articles-IV and V, there is no doubt that the charges have been held proved against the applicant, i.e. Articles-I-III which were grave enough to impose the major penalty of dismissal from service which was ~~concluded~~ <sup>re</sup>concluded by the appellate authority. Therefore, he has submitted that there is no infirmity in the

impugned orders. With regard to Article-I, he has submitted that there were witnesses, for example, PW-I who has stated that the applicant left the Control Room at 12.30 hours on 12.6.1992. He has relied on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL Vs. B. Karunakar & Ors. (JT 1993 (6) SC 1) and has submitted that no prejudice has been caused to the applicant as the punishment order has been correctly given to him based on the facts and evidence adduced before the Departmental inquiry. He has also, relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana Vs. Rattan Singh (1977 SCC (L&S) 298), submitted that even hearsay evidence is admissible in a Departmental inquiry. He has, therefore, contended that all the three charges on the basis of which the applicant has been punished have been fully proved. In the circumstances, he has submitted that the Tribunal ought not to re-assess the evidence to come to a different conclusion as there is nothing contrary to the decisions taken by the respondents.

9. Shri M.S. Ramamurthy, learned counsel, has also been heard in rejoinder. <sup>He</sup> has reiterated the arguments submitted by him earlier, namely, that this is a case of no evidence. He has also stressed on the fact that there is no basis in the allegation of Article-I of the charge, as the applicant has been effectively

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prevented from carrying out his duties by the respondents themselves who have issued the order dated 11.6.1992 fixing the shift schedule of Dhurva operation from that date, in which the applicant's name does not figure. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondents has drawn our attention to page 16 of the Inquiry Officer's report which has dealt with this issue (copy of the report was submitted at the time of hearing). In his discussion of the evidence, the Inquiry Officer has stated, inter alia, that based on the examination-in-Chief of the prosecution witness and the document submitted, that is the shift schedule, the applicant was required to perform duty on 12.6.1992 but he did not perform duty and thus the charge levelled against him in Article-I has been substantiated and established. Learned counsel for the respondents has also relied on the judgements of the Supreme Court in Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police and Ors. (1999(1) LLJ P-170 and Union of India & Ors. Vs. A. Nagamalleshwar Rao. (1998 SCC (L&S) 363). (copies placed on record). He has submitted that the Tribunal is not to re-assess the evidence and so long as there is evidence, as in the present case and the penalty order is not perverse, the O.A. may be dismissed.

10. We have carefully considered the pleadings and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.

Yours

11. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that this is a case of no evidence cannot be agreed to, having regard to the evidence and record produced in the Departmental proceedings held against the applicant. Shri M.S. Ramamurthy, learned counsel has submitted that while the disciplinary authority has disagreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer who had held that Articles-IV and V of the charge were not proved, he has not followed the principles of natural justice or the rules relying on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Kunj Bihari's case (supra). While the disciplinary authority did not fully agree with the Inquiry Officer's report with regard to Article-IV of the charge for the reasons he has recorded in the impugned penalty order and has given the benefit of doubt with regard to Article V of the charges, it is relevant to note that the appellate authority has applied his mind to this contention raised by the applicant. He has also noted that the disciplinary authority has to this extent not given the applicant an opportunity before coming to conclusion on Articles-IV and V. Both the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have passed speaking orders. With regard to Articles of charges I-III which have been held as proved by the Inquiry Officer, the same has been done after consideration of the facts and evidence brought on record during the Departmental inquiry proceedings. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we see force in the

submissions made by Shri R.R. Shetty, learned counsel that the appellate authority in his order, has come to the conclusion that the relevant rules of procedure have been complied with and as the charges contained in Articles-I,II and III are serious enough individually to call for a major penalty independently he does not find any reason to disagree with the disciplinary authority's order. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be held that the principles of natural justice have been violated because what has been taken into consideration are the findings arrived at by the competent authorities on three articles of charges which have been held proved by the Inquiry Officer, the disciplinary and appellate authorities based on the evidence of record. Therefore, as no prejudice can also be held to have been caused to the applicant, the plea taken by him to the contrary is rejected.

12. The other main contention of the learned counsel for the applicant was that the Register produced by the respondents in the Departmental proceedings was not the actual relied upon document, i.e. the "Area Log Book" but was a "Complaints Book" in which the applicant had written the grievance and demands of the Union. The Register was produced by the respondents during the hearing for our perusal. The applicant does not deny the fact that this register in which he has written the complaints, was a Register available in the Control Room of the Retractor.

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In this Register, there are also certain entries which can be referred to as the 'Log Book' of the work place/Reactor. In the circumstances of the case, we are unable to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the applicant that the "Complaints Book/Register" which was to be maintained in the Control Room, was a "Complaints Register" and not the "Area Log Book". Learned counsel for the respondents had also pointed out that the heading (SFSB) of the Register itself shows that it is an official book and the contention of the applicant's counsel that because most of the entries were relating to the complaints for better functioning of the organisation and so on and, therefore, it should be considered as a "Complaints Register" is not tenable. It is also relevant to note that this Register was to be maintained in the Control Room of the Reactor. During the hearing, learned counsel for the applicant had also wanted to refer to certain other document(s) which, according to him, was a part of the "Area Log Book" but for whatever reasons those documents were neither verified or filed earlier in the O.A. However, he has contended that they have been referred to during the hearing. In the circumstances of the case, those documents will not assist the applicant as what has been alleged in Article-II is that the applicant did not write the Reactor Area Log Book showing the status of the Plant which was part of his duties but had misused the Log Book in the Control Room to write certain remarks in the form of demands unrelated to his official

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duties. The disciplinary authority has found the charge proved. The appellate authority in his order has specifically referred to the applicant's submission that another Register was in existence, to which he has commented that it is not understood how the existence or non-existence of the register is relevant to the charge of a misconduct committed by the applicant and that the applicant is only trying to confuse the issues by bringing these irrelevant factors. It is relevant to note that the applicant himself has not denied that he had written the complaints and demands of the Union in a register which was in the Control Room of the Reactor and this fact read with the allegation in Article-II, therefore, shows that the findings of the competent authorities that he had misused the Log Book cannot be held to be either illegal, arbitrary or perverse to justify any interference in this matter.

13. With regard to the other main contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant had been prevented from doing his duties and had not deserted the duty place on 12.6.1992, we find that the competent authorities have also applied their mind and given reasons for their conclusion to the contrary. The same is also based on evidence and records. The judgement of the Supreme Court in Rattan Singh's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is

relevant to the facts in this case. The appellate authority has also analysed this position that even if the prosecution witness did not have direct knowledge about the incident and the Shift Engineer did not give any evidence against the applicant but there was sufficient material on the basis of which the charge was held proved. It is settled law that the Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the competent authorities where they are not utterly arbitrary or perverse in exercise of powers of judicial review or substitute its own discretion for that of the competent authority or substitute the penalty order except where it is arbitrary or perverse (See. Union of India Vs. Parmananda (AIR 1989 SC 1185), Government of Tamil Nadu Vs. A. Rajapandian (AIR 1995 SC 561) and the judgement relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in Kuldeep Singh's case (supra). As mentioned above, we are unable to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel that this is a case of no evidence. It is also clear from a perusal of the Departmental proceedings that the applicant has been given reasonable opportunity to put forward his case and the principles of natural justice have been complied with. In the circumstances of the case, we agree with the findings of the appellate authority that based on the findings of the Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary

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authority on articles of charges I, II and III, which are sufficiently serious, the penalty order of dismissal imposed on the applicant is neither arbitrary or perverse to justify any interference in the matter.

14. In the result, for the reasons given above, we find no merit in the application. O.A.768/96 accordingly fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.

O.A. 654/96

As mentioned above, in the second application, namely, O.A. 654/96, we have to consider only the additional submissions made by Shri S. Natrajan, learned counsel with regard to the specific articles of charge levelled against this applicant. In this case, the applicant was given four articles of charge, namely, Articles-I,II,III and IV. Article-I relates to the allegation that while functioning as Tradesman (C) in the Reactor Operations Division, the applicant had deserted his duty post without handing over the charge/without being relieved from duty on 11.6.1992 at about 1430 hours; Article-II relates to the allegation that the applicant stopped writing the Reactor Area Log Book which is a part of his duties since November, 1991 onwards and wrote certain remarks in the form of demands

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unrelated to his official duties in the Reactor log book; Article-III states that he had exhorted, instigated and abetted the plant operators of Dhruva/CIRUS Reactors on 11.6.1992 to abandon their duty and he along with other Plant operators thus resorted to a form of strike in connection with certain demands pertaining to his services; and Article-IV relates to the allegation that he gave certain (misleading) information to the Press.

2. The Inquiry Officer in his report had also found that Articles I-III were proved and Article-IV as not proved. The learned counsel for the applicant had very vehemently submitted that there is no such procedure of handing over and taking over of duty in the work place and under the Regulations applicable to the applicant, he could go for his bath which was compulsory and what he termed as "statutory" at 2.30 p.m. This, according to him, by no stretch of imagination can be held to be desertion of duty. He has also submitted that as the applicant was attached to a regular operator, Mr. Sharma, who was responsible to write the log book, the applicant cannot be blamed or charge-sheeted for not doing so. He has also contended that the Area Log Book given in the list of documents was not presented during the hearing but he was unable to show any representation, if any, made by the applicant during the Departmental proceedings for production of what he called the "real" Log Book. He has also

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very vehemently submitted that the respondents could at best charge the applicant for misuse of the stationery material they had provided in the Reactor Control Room and nothing more for which the punishment of dismissal was too harsh. However, the applicant was unable to show what representation, if any, the applicant had submitted during the hearing for production of the "real" Log Book. It is, however, relevant to note that in the Inquiry Officer's report dated 9.3.1995 (page 125 of the paper book), it has been stated that 12 documents, including the Area Log Book, Ex. P-5, were produced and taken on record which has been emphasised by the learned counsel for the respondents. Shri S. Natrajan, learned counsel has submitted that Ex.P-5 which allegedly is the log book, was not furnished to the applicant. The respondents, on the other hand, have submitted that the log book has been produced during the inquiry and taken on record. The learned counsel for the applicant has also submitted that since November, 1991, the applicant was posted as Under Licensing Operator and there was no duty asssigned to him as he was not entitled to function as an Operator under the Regulations. He has very vehemently submitted that the Log Book was to be written by the Shift Engineer in the Control Room although he does not deny the fact that the Log Book in which the applicant had written certain complaints and grievances of the Union was indeed available in the Control Room. With regard to Article-III, the learned counsel for the applicant has contended that this is a

case of no evidence. Regarding the punishment awarded to the applicant, he has also contended that it is too harsh even if it is held that all the three articles of charges are proved against the applicant. He has also referred to the evidence adduced before the Inquiry Officer to contend that the conclusions of the Inquiry Officers are not valid. He has submitted that the applicant was on leave on 12.6.1992 and thereafter he was placed under suspension on 13.6.1992.

2. The respondents have controverted the above submissions. Learned counsel for the respondents has referred to the findings of the Inquiry Officer in his report dated 9.3.1995 (pages 158-162), in which he has dealt with the specific submissions of the applicant, referred to above. According to him, there was specific material by way of statements of the prosecution witnesses and defence witnesses and other evidence to prove the articles of charges against the applicant. He has, therefore, submitted that in the circumstances of the case, the O.A. may be dismissed as there are no grounds on which the Tribunal can set aside the penalty orders which have been passed in a legal and proper manner in accordance with the law and Rules.

3. We have also considered the additional facts and submission made by Shri S. Natrajan, learned counsel. The penalty orders passed by the respondents in both the

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aforementioned two cases cannot be held to be excessive or perverse or arbitrary as contended by the learned counsel for the applicant, taking into account the nature of duties and responsibilities of the applicants who are admittedly working in the Reactor Control Room on Dhruva/CIRUS Reactors of BARC. The grounds taken by the learned counsel for the applicant in OA 654/96 have been dealt with by the Inquiry Officer in his report as well as the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. The submission made by Shri S. Natrajan, learned counsel that since Mr. Sharma who was a more senior Operator was not given an equally severe punishment, therefore, the punishment in this case should be set aside, has no basis, as it has not been shown in the O.A. by the applicant that his case is exactly the same or similar on the relevant grounds to that of other case. The submissions made by the learned counsel that the applicant had been victimised by the respondents because he was an office bearer of a Union only and was trying to protect the workers by making the entries of demands and grievances in the Log Book and so on, have also no relevance because the articles of charges pertain to his duties and alleged misconduct which have been held as proved. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find the conclusions of the competent authorities either arbitrary or perverse. Accordingly, the punishment imposed on the applicant does not justify any interference as we neither find it arbitrary, perverse or are able to come to the

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conclusion that the Departmental inquiry has been held de hors the Rules or the principles of natural justice. The learned counsel in the above cases have also not contended that they have not had a reasonable opportunity to defend their cases in the Departmental inquiry proceedings. As this is also not a case where there is no evidence, as contended by the learned counsel for the applicant, we would not be justified to reappraise the evidence to come to a different conclusion or to substitute our conclusion for that of the competent authority. The other submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicant which are in all fours with those raised by Shri M.S. Ramamurthy, learned counsel in O.A.768/1996 have also been dealt with in that O.A. The shift duty letter dated 11.6.1992 and the fact that the applicant was on leave on 12.6.1992 would also not assist him as what has been alleged in Article-I of the charge is that he had left duty on 11.6.1992 without handing over the charge or without being relieved. These relevant facts have been fully gone into and discussed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority in their orders. We have also considered the other submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicant in both the aforesaid Original Applications but do not find any merit in the same to justify any interference in the matter having regard to the settled principles of law in the Disciplinary proceedings

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by the Courts/Tribunal in the exercise of judicial review. In *Union of India Vs. Parma Nanda* (AIR 1989 SC 1185) which has been followed in a catena of the judgements of the Tribunal, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

"...The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Art.309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with the principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is *mala fide* is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter".

4. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the discussion above, we find no good grounds to interfere in the penalty orders. The O.A. is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

B Bahadur

(B.N. Bahadur)  
Member(A)

'SRD'

Lakshmi Swaminathan

(Smt. Lakshmi Swaminathan)  
Vice Chairman(J)