CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ERNAKULAM BENCH

OA No.205/96

Thursday, this the 25th day of April, 1996.

C O R A M

HON'BLE MR JUSTICE CHETTUR SANKARAN NAIR, VICE CHAIRMAN
HON'BLE MR PV VENKATAKRISHNAN, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER

....

D Prasannakumar,
Staff Code 24445, Office Clerk B,
Public Relations/Personnel & General Administration,
Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre,
(Removed from Service) residing at
TC 27/1832, Devaki, Vayalar Lane,
Vanchiycor PO, Thiruvananthapuram--35.

....Applicant

By Advocate Shri GP Mohanachandran.

vs

1. Head, Personnel and General Administration,
   Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre,
   Trivandrum--22.

2. Controller, Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre,
   Trivandrum--22.

3. Director, Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre,
   Trivandrum--22.

4. Union of India represented by the Secretary,
   Department of Space, Bangalore.

....Respondents

By Advocate Shri CN Radhakrishnan.

The application having been heard on 18th April, 1996, the Tribunal delivered the following on 25th April, 1996.

O R D E R

PV VENKATAKRISHNAN, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER

While working as Office Clerk 'B' (OCB) in the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (VSSC), applicant was subjected to disciplinary proceedings for unauthorised absence resulting, at the appellate level, in reduction in rank from OCB to Office Clerk 'A' (OCA). The period of absence was treated as dies-non. This was challenged in OAK 214/88. The Tribunal set aside the

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appellate order and remitted the case to the Appellate Authority for de novo consideration. Thereupon, the Appellate Authority considered the matter again and confirmed the reduction in rank but modified the treatment of the period of absence, changing it from dies-non to eligible leave. This was challenged in OA 332/90. The Tribunal quashed the orders of the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities and remitted the case to the Disciplinary Authority to hold the disciplinary proceedings afresh from the stage of the charge sheet already issued to applicant, and to pass orders regarding the regularisation of the period of absence from 10.7.87 (a mistake for 10.1.87) to 1.2.88. The Disciplinary Authority passed fresh orders in A6 dated 20.7.93 imposing the penalty of removal from service. OA 1256/93 was filed challenging the A6 orders of the Disciplinary Authority. The Tribunal at the stage of admission directed applicant to file an appeal to the Appellate Authority. The OA was disposed of with a direction to the Appellate Authority to pass orders on the appeal on or before 2.11.93. The Appellate Authority passed orders on the appeal by A24 dated 30.10.93 confirming the orders of the Disciplinary Authority. Applicant challenged the appellate orders in OA 1911/93 and the Tribunal disposed of the application stating:

> "All these aspects will no doubt receive the attention of the Revision Authority."

Applicant filed a revision petition. In the revision petition also, the applicant repeated his request (made earlier to the Appellate Authority at the personal hearing) that he be permitted to retire voluntarily. The Revisional Authority passed order A27 dated 24.7.95 confirming the orders of the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities. This application is filed challenging the orders of

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the Disciplinary Authority A6 dated 20.7.93, the Appellate Authority A24 dated 30.10.93 and the Revisional Authority A27 dated 24.7.95.

2. Applicant prays that the impugned orders A6, A24 and A27 removing him from service be quashed and further prays for a direction to reinstate him in service as OCB with consequential benefits including arrears of salary. In support of his prayers, he urges the following grounds:

(1) The charge of unauthorised absence is not established and the finding on the charge is perverse, since the absence was on account of ill-health as seen from the medical certificates produced from highly qualified government doctors and specialists;

(2) The Disciplinary Authority erred in considering the absence of the applicant during periods preceding and succeeding the period under consideration in the enquiry. For such earlier periods, he had already been granted leave and had appeared before the VSSC Medical Board. Moreover, a second disciplinary proceedings had been initiated for unauthorised absence and is pending finalisation;

(3) The Disciplinary Authority's view that the medical certificates were not genuine goes against the observation of the Tribunal;

(4) The appellate order also strongly relies on the absence of the applicant in a subsequent period for upholding the penalty;

(5) Even though the orders of the Appellate Authority on an earlier occasion, imposing a penalty of reduction in rank, had been set aside, the Appellate Authority should have taken that into consideration while considering the quantum of punishment. The Appellate Authority as the successor-in-office of the earlier Appellate Authority should not have arrived at a different decision on the quantum of punishment of imposing the penalty of removal when the Appellate Authority had already come to a conclusion that the penalty of reduction in rank is adequate penalty for the charges found against the applicant; and

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(6) Applicant had applied for voluntary retirement on 5.7.93 and the order of removal passed after that on 20.7.93 is unfair and arbitrary. Despite the observations of the Tribunal in OA 1911/93 that the request for voluntary retirement should be considered, it was not and this has resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice.

3. The impugned orders have elaborately dealt with all the contentions raised by the applicant on various occasions. The grounds referred to in para 2 above were considered in depth by us after hearing the learned counsel for applicant at great length, keeping in view the scope for such consideration while exercising the powers of judicial review in such cases.

4. The first contention of the applicant is that the charge of unauthorised absence has not been established, and that the medical certificates produced by him have not been properly considered. The applicant himself in his letter dated 6.3.87 (R1) states:

"I admit the charges."

It would be idle to contend, therefore, that the charge was not established. The question of mitigating circumstances would only be relevant for deciding the quantum of punishment. It is seen that though the applicant has produced a plethora of medical certificates from different doctors that he was suffering from various diseases, there are gaps not covered by any certificate when he did not report for duty; besides, when examined by the Medical Board at a time when he had been certified by a doctor to be suffering from viral hepatitis, he had been found fit for duty and this led the Disciplinary Authority to place little faith in the genuineness of the certificate in question. Further, applicant failed to report before the Medical Board when directed to do

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so in July, 1987. Under these circumstances, we cannot hold that there was no evidence to find the charges or that the finding of the Disciplinary Authority was perverse, unreasonable or arbitrary. It matters not that another view may be possible on the facts. No mala fides are shown against any of the officers at different levels who passed the several impugned orders. The findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority cannot be interfered with in such circumstances by the Tribunal.

5. The second contention of the applicant has no force. It is open to the authorities to consider the general circumstances regarding the applicant to decide on the quantum of the punishment and to decide whether applicant deserves any leniency. Respondents have clearly stated that the second disciplinary proceedings could not be finalised since the first proceedings were under challenge before the Tribunal.

6. There have been no findings by the Tribunal on the medical certificates. In any case, the Tribunal cannot appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion since this is not an appellate proceedings. The third contention of the applicant cannot be accepted.

7. The fourth contention is already covered by the second contention, and, as stated in para 5 above, does not merit acceptance.

8. The fifth contention was elaborately argued by the learned counsel for applicant. He cited RT Rangachari vs Secretary of State, AIR 1937 Privy Council, 27, to show that respondents cannot

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arrive at a decision to remove applicant where, on the same facts, they have earlier decided to impose a punishment of reduction in rank. That case refers to a case in which government officials duly competent and duly authorised in that behalf having arrived honestly at one decision, their successors in office, after the decision has been acted upon and was in effective operation, purported to enter upon a reconsideration of the matter and to arrive at another and totally different decision. But there the reconsideration was done suo moto. At the time of reconsideration, the first order was still subsisting. In the case before us, however, the earlier decision was quashed by the Tribunal. There was no earlier order subsisting. That left the field free for respondents to take a new decision entirely independent of the earlier decision. When the Tribunal quashed the Disciplinary Authority's and Appellate Authority's orders not on merit, but on the technical ground that due procedure had not been followed, without any direction that a lesser penalty may be awarded, there is nothing to prevent the Appellate Authority from awarding a penalty higher than the one he had earlier ordered taking a lenient view. At any rate, whatever was there earlier had been wiped out by the Tribunal, that too, at the instance of applicant. He cannot now seek to resurrect it. The Disciplinary Authority, it may be noted, has on all the occasions awarded the penalty of removal from service. The case cited is, therefore, of no assistance to the applicant.

9. The sixth and last contention relates to the request of the applicant for voluntary retirement. Rule 48-A of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 reads:

> "2. The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-rule (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority..."

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Government of India's decision under Rule 48-A states:

> "(iii) Guidelines for acceptance of notice:-
> ...such acceptance may be generally given in all cases except those (a) in which disciplinary proceedings are pending or contemplated against the Government servant concerned for the imposition of a major penalty and the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, is of the view that the imposition of the penalty of removal or dismissal from service would be warranted in the case..."

Since there was a disciplinary case with a major penalty under process, the applicant could not have been permitted to retire voluntarily. The authorities cannot be faulted for that.

10. It is well settled that the Tribunal while exercising the power of judicial review over disciplinary proceedings, does not exercise appellate powers. The position is elaborately discussed in State Bank of India and Others vs Samarendra Kishore Endow and Another, (1994) 27 ATC 149. The Supreme Court stated (at pages 154-157):

> "10. On the question of punishment, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the punishment awarded is excessive and that lesser punishment would meet the ends of justice. It may be noticed that the imposition of appropriate punishment is within the discretion and judgment of the Disciplinary Authority. It may be open to the appellate authority to interfere with it but not to the High Court or to the Administrative Tribunal for the reason that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is similar to the powers of the High Court under Article 226. The power under Article 226 is one of

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judicial review. It "is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made". (Per Lord Brightman in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141, 155, and HB Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v Gopinath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312.) In other words the power of judicial review is meant "to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is is authorised by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court". (Per Lord Marylebone in Chief Constable v Evans). In fact in service matters, it was held by this Court as far back as 1963 in State of AP v S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, that:

"The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental inquiry against a public servant; it is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the inquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some consideration extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the inquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal

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evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding...under Article 226 of the Constitution."

11. Now, coming to the power of the Court exercising judicial review to interfere on the question of penalty, it was held by a Constitution Bench in State of Orissa v Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779, thus:

"But the Court in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned, is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour established. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an inquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable; nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. If the High Court is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the Tribunal were 'unassailable', the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the inquiry officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice."

This principle was reiterated in Railway Board, Delhi v Niranjan Singh, (1969) 1 SCC 502. The same view was reiterated by this Court in Union of India v Parma Nanda, (1989) 2 SCC 177.

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It was an appeal from the judgment and order of an Administrative Tribunal. K Jagannatha Shetty, J, speaking for the Bench observed in the first instance that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is similar to the jurisdiction of the High Court in a writ proceeding and then dealt with the power of the Tribunal to interfere with the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. The learned Judge referred to the holding in State of Orissa v Bidyabhushan Mohapatra (quoted by us hereinabove) and after referring tc several other judgments of this Court, concluded thus: (SCC p 189, para 27)

"We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an inquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principle of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter."

(Emphasis supplied)

"12. It is significant to mention that the learned Judge also referred to the decision of this Court in Bhagat Ram v State of HP, (1983) 2 SCC 442, and held, on a consideration of the facts and principle thereof, that, "This decision is, therefore, no authority for the proposition that the High Court or the Tribunal has

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jurisdiction to impose any punishment to meet the ends of justice". And then added significantly "it may be noted that this Court exercised the equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 (in Bhagat Ram) and the High Court and Tribunal has no such power of jurisdiction". The learned Judge also quoted with approval the observations of Mathew, J in Union of India v Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618, to the following effect: (SCC p 624, para 19)

"Now it is settled by the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779, that if the order of a punishing authority can be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether the charge proved alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment. The Court is not concerned to decide whether the punishment imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the misdemeanour established."

13. It would perhaps be appropriate to mention at this stage that there are certain observations in Union of India v Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, which, at first look appear to say that the Court can interfere where the penalty imposed is "arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all proportion to the offence committed or not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case or the requirements of that particular government service". It must however be remembered that Tulsiram Patel dealt with cases arising under proviso (a) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Tulsiram Patel overruled the earlier decision of this Court in Chellappan, (Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Rly v TR Chellappan, (1976) 3 SCC 190). While holding that no notice need be given before imposing the penalty in a case dealt with under the said proviso, the Court held that if a disproportionate or harsh punishment is imposed by the disciplinary authority, it can be

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> corrected either by the appellate court or by the High Court. These observations are not relevant to cases of penalty imposed after regular inquiry. Indeed this is how the said observations have been understood in Parma Nanda referred to above (vide para 29). The same comment holds with respect to the decision in Shankar Das v Union of India, (1985) 2 SCC 358, which too was a case arising under proviso (a) to Article 311(2)."

In State of Tamil Nadu & Anr vs S Subramaniam, JT 1996 (2) SC 114, the Supreme Court stated:

> "5. The only question is: whether the Tribunal was right in its conclusion to appreciate the evidence and to reach its own finding that the charge has not been proved. The Tribunal is not a court of appeal. The power of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was taken away by the power under Article 323A and invested the same on the Tribunal by Central Administrative Tribunals Act. It is settled law that the Tribunal has only power of judicial review of the administrative action of the appellant on complaints relating to service conditions of employees. It is the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority to consider the evidence on record and to record findings whether the charge has been proved or not. It is equally settled law that technical rules of evidence has no application for the disciplinary proceedings and the authority is to consider the material on record. In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an apeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent received fair treatment and not to

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ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the view of the court or tribunal. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, Tribunal is devoid of power to re-appreciate the evidence and would come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. This is consistent view of this Court vide BC Chaturvedi vs Union of India (JT 1995 (8) SC 65), State of Tamil Nadu vs TV Venugopalan [(1994) 6 SCC 302 para 7], Union of India vs Upendra Singh, [(1994) 3 SCC 357 at para 6], Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr vs A Rajapandian, [(1995) 1 SCC 216 para 4] and Union of India vs BS Chaturvedi, [(1995) 6 SCC 749 at 759-60]. In view of the settled legal position, the Tribunal has committed serious error of law in appreciation of the evidence and in coming to its own conclusion that the charge had not been proved. Thus we hold that the view of the Tribunal is ex facie illegal. The order is accordingly set aside. OA/TP/WP stand dismissed."

In Transport Commissioner, Madras 5 vs A Radha Krishna Moorthy, 1995 SCC (L&S) 313, the Supreme Court stated:

"7. So far as the truth and correctness of the charges is concerned, it was not a matter for the Tribunal to go into--more particularly at a stage prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry. As pointed out by this Court repeatedly, even when the matter comes to the Tribunal after the imposition of punishment, it has no jurisdiction to go into truth of the allegations/charges except in a case where they are based on no evidence, i.e., where they are perverse. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is akin to that of the High Court

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> under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is power of judicial review. It only examines the procedural correctness of the decision-making process. For this reason the order of the Tribunal insofar as it goes into or discusses the truth and correctness of the charges, is unsustainable in law."

11. Applicant pleads that the punishment of removal from service is harsh and disproportionate to the charge. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority has been clearly enunciated in Union of India vs Parma Nanda, (1989) 10 ATC 30, para 27 of which has already been extracted in para 10 above. Dealing with a contention that the Supreme Court had reduced the penalty in Bhagat Ram vs State of HP, (1983) 2 SCC 442, the Supreme Court stated (in Parma Nanda at p 43):

> "...This decision is, therefore, no authority for the proposition that the High Court or the Tribunal has jurisdiction to impose any punishment to meet the ends of justice. It may be noted that this Court exercised the equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 and the High Court or Tribunal has no such power or jurisdiction."
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> [Emphasis added]

In Union of India vs Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618, the Supreme Court stated (p 624):

> "The Court is not concerned to decide whether the punishment imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the misdemeanour established."

This is reiterated in Government of Tamil Nadu and Another vs A Rajapandian, AIR 1995 SC 561.

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In BC Chaturvedi vs Union of India and others, (1996) 32 ATC 44, the Supreme Court stated that if the punishment imposed shocks the conscience of the Court, appropriate relief can be granted. It was stated (at p 55):

> "18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude of gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."

12. It is thus seen that the scope for interference by the Tribunal in the penalty imposed is circumscribed. Keeping all the circumstances in view, we are unable to hold that the penalty is such as would shock the judicial conscience. In State of UP and Others vs Ashok Kumar Singh and Another, (1996) 32 ATC 239, the Supreme Court considered the removal of a police constable for absenting himself on several occasions. The High Court held:

> "In the present case, the only charge against the petitioner was that he absented himself from duty for long periods although it was his case that he applied for grant of leave. Even if it is assumed

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> that the petitioner, against whom there appears to be no charge of misconduct of grave nature, has proved his absence from duty would not amount to such a grave charge for which the extreme penalty of dismissal may be imposed...extreme penalty imposed against the petitioner does not commensurate with the gravity of the charge,..."

The Supreme Court did not agree with this view and held:

> "8. We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in modifying the punishment while concurring with the findings of the Tribunal on facts. The High Court failed to bear in mind that the first respondent was a police constable and was serving in a disciplined force demanding strict adherence to the rules and procedures more than any other department. Having noticed the fact that the first respondent has absented himself from duty without leave on several occasions, we are unable to appreciate the High Court's observation that "his absence from duty would not amount to such a grave charge". Even otherwise on the facts of this case, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the punishment holding that "the punishment does not commensurate with the gravity of the charge" especially when the High Court concurred with the findings of the Tribunal on facts. No case for interference with the punishment is made out."

The respondent-organisation has been charged with time-bound tasks of great national importance, and cannot, equally, tolerate slackness and indiscipline. The Appellate Authority has stated the reason why he has not shown any leniency in the matter of punishment:

> "...the appellant...by his own admission, and through his conduct...(has) shown that he is unworthy of the calling of a public servant. Such

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public servants bring shame to themselves and tarnish the image of Government. They do not deserve any payment from the public exchequer."

This cannot be considered as something shocking to the judicial conscience to attract the rule in Union of India vs Giri Raj Sharma, AIR 1994 SC 215.

13. We do not think we would be justified in interfering with the quantum of punishment.

14. In the result, the application is without merit and is dismissed. No costs.

Dated the 25th April, 1996.

PV VENKATAKRISHNAN
ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER

CHETTUR SANKARAN NAIR (J)
VICE CHAIRMAN

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LIST OF ANNEXURES

1. Annexure A6: True copy of order No.VSSC/DLS/DC/566/87/91/93/325 dt. 20.7.1993 issued by the Head, Personnel and Gemeral Administration, Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, Trivandrum, (the Ist Respondent) removing the applicant from service.

2. AnnexureA24: True copy of the Appellate order No.VSSC/DLS/DC/566/87/93 dated. 30.10.1993 issued by Controller , Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, Trivandrum, the 2nd Respondent.

3. Annexure A27: True copy of order No.VSSC/DLS/DC/566/93/95/311 dated 24.7.95, issued by Director, Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, Trivandrum the 3rd Respondent rejecting the revision Petition.

4. Annexure R1: Copy of letter dated 6.3.1987 of Shri D Prasannakumar - applicant.

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