

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL  
ERNAKULAM BENCH

O.A. NO.550/97

FRIDAY, THIS THE 28th DAY OF APRIL, 2000.

C O R A M;

HON'BLE MR. A. M. SIVADAS, JUDICIAL MEMBER  
HON'BLE MR. G. RAMAKRISHNAN, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER

P.N.Pillai S/o C.P.Pillai  
Retired Station Master,  
Ginegere Railway Station,  
South Central Railway  
residing at Onampallil  
Haripad Post,  
Kerala

..Applicant

By Advocate Mr. T. C. Govindaswamy

Vs

1. Union of India represented by  
the General Manager,  
South Central Railway,  
Rail Nilayam,  
Secundarabad
2. The Divisional Railway Manager,  
South Central Railway,  
Hubli Division  
Hubli, Karnataka
3. The Divisional Personnel Officer,  
South Central Railway,  
Hubli division,  
Hubli, Karnataka.

..Respondents

By Advocate Smt. Sumathi Dandapani


This application having been heard on 5.4.2000,  
the Tribunal delivered the following on 28.4.2000.

O R D E R

HON'BLE MR. G. RAMAKRISHNAN, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER

The applicant who is a retired Station Master of  
South Central Railway, Hubli Division aggrieved by A-7  
order dated 25.11.96 filed this O.A. seeking the  
following reliefs:

(a) Call for the records leading to the issue of  
Annexure A7 and quash the same.



(b) Direct the respondents to treat the period of suspension from 15.3.84 to 1.2.85 as leave on half average pay and accordingly revise applicant's pension and other retiral benefits.

(c) Declare that the applicant's subsistence allowance fixed with effect from 25.5.85 is liable to be enhanced by 50% and paid with effect from 24.8.85 in the light of rule 1345(a)(i) of the Indian railway Establishment code and direct the respondents accordingly;

(d) Declare that the applicant is entitled to have his subsistence allowance calculated on and with effect from 1.1.86 based on the pay in the replacement stage in the replaced scale entitled to under Railway Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1986

(e) declare that the applicant is entitled to have his leave salary paid for 135 days of leave on average pay, duly deducting the leave salary paid for 66 days and direct the respondents accordingly

(f) Declare that the period from 15.2.1967 to 27.3.67 is liable to be treated as qualifying service of pensionary benefits and direct the respondents accordingly.

(g) Pass such other orders or directions as deemed just, fit and necessary in the facts and circumstesances of the case.

2. While the applicant was in service as Station Master, Jarandeshwar in Hubli Division, he was placed under suspension with effect from 15.3.84 in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. The suspension was revoked with effect from 2.2.85. The disciplinary proceedings initiated in continuation of the order of suspension culminated in the imposition of a penalty of compulsory retirement with effect from 25.5.85. He approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 2204/93. That O.A. was disposed of by this Tribunal by A-1 order dated 20.12.94. The Contempt petition (civil) No. 108/95 filed by the applicant was dismissed by this Tribunal by A2 order dated 29.9.95. It was also observed therein that if the petitioner had any other grievance he must seek redressal outside the Contempt Petition. Applicant filed A3 representation dated 2.10.95 to the second respondent.



Prior to A3, the applicant had submitted A-4 representation dated 20.9.95 in which among other things the applicant had prayed for treating the period of suspension from 15.3.84 to 1.2.85 as one spent on duty or in the alternative, atleast as on leave on half average pay. He did not get any response to A3 and A4. He filed O.A. No. 138/96 in the Tribunal which was disposed of by A-5 order dated 11.7.96. In this order, regarding his claim under paragraph 1345 of the Code, the second respondent was directed to pass appropriate orders on A3 and A4. Applicant submitted A-6 detailed representation dated 24.7.96. Second respondent issued A-7 letter dated 25.11.96 in which the period of suspension was treated as suspension only. Relying on A-8 letter dated 6.2.85 and the treatment of the above period of suspension as duty/leave on half average pay, the applicant claimed leave salary for 135 days instead of the leave salary for 66 days paid to him. Further, according to the applicant, his subsistence allowance directed to be paid by the Tribunal from 25.5.85 was liable to be revised to 75% on completion of 3 months from 25.5.85 and also liable to be paid based on the Fourth Pay Commission Scale of pay with effect from 1.1.86. These aspects raised in A-3 and A-4 were not considered in A-7 and A-7 was ex facie without application of mind, arbitrary, discriminatory and illegal. Thus, aggrieved by A-7 he filed this O.A. seeking the reliefs mentioned above.

3. Respondents filed reply statement resisting the claims of the applicant. according to them the O.A. was barred by limitation and also hit by the principles of res judicata. They submitted that initially when CP(C) was closed as per A-2 order, the applicant was given liberty

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to seek redressal of his grievances by resorting to other remedies. Subsequently A-3 representation was filed claiming difference of dues of the DCRG, Commutation and Subsistence allowance from 25.5.85 to 31.10.94. When he was not satisfied with the reliefs granted, he had already approached this Tribunal in O.A. No.138/96 on which directions were given by the Tribunal by A-5 order dated 11.7.96. According to the respondents these orders were to be read with the orders passed by the tribunal on 20.12.94 in O.A. No.2204/93. Pursuant to the directions in the said O.A., since the pension was fixed in pre-revised scale, the Tribunal interfered with the same. The Tribunal made it clear in that order that retiral benefits were to be calculated on the basis of the rules in force on the date of his retirement i.e. 31.10.94 and arrears paid within three months. According to the respondents, this was the only relief that was granted by the Tribunal and hence the claim made now, in addition, are beyond the scope of the order already passed by the Tribunal. The claims of the applicant was barred by res judicata and he was estopped from claiming various reliefs as moulded in the Original Application. They denied that A-7 was non-speaking. According to them, the contention of the applicant for enhancement of the subsistence allowance after three months from 25.5.85 was not supported by any rules as the same was not covered by para 1345 of the Code. The claim of the applicant for payment of subsistence allowance in Fourth Pay Commission scales with effect from 1.1.86 was not permissible in terms of para 4 of R-1 circular dated 24.11.86 as he was not restored from suspension for duty after 1.1.86. They submitted that the O.A. was devoid of merits and was liable to be dismissed.



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4. Heard learned counsel for the parties. we have given careful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the rival pleadings and have perused the documents brought on record.

5. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that the suspension of applicant was revoked with effect from 2.2.1985 pending finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings and in terms of Rule 1345 (6) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol.II(IREC for short) the competent authority was bound to pass an order as to how to regulate the period. The period of suspension was to be regulated as duty or non-duty. There was no provision under the rules to treat the period as suspension only. Even when in cases where the period was treated as non duty, it could be treated as duty for any specific purpose. He submitted that in any case the order in this regard could be passed only after giving an opportunity of showing cause to the applicant. He relied on the ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. Gopalakrishna Naidu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1968 SLC 240). He further submitted that in terms of Rule 1345(7), the competent authority was bound to order that the period of suspension should be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the applicant if so desired by him. He submitted that in A-4 the applicant had specifically prayed that the period of suspension from 15.3.84 to 1.2.85 be treated as leave on half average pay in the applicant's credit who had 451 days of half average pay leave to his credit. Relying on the direction contained in A-5 order dated 11.7.96 he submitted that the issue was

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not barred by resjudicata. He relied on the following directions contained in para 3 of A-5 order dated 11.7.96 the Tribunal:

"As for his claim for benefits under Paragraph 1345 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, we direct second respondent to pass appropriate orders on A3 and A4 representations, also within three months from today"

Regarding the plea of the learned counsel for respondents that the matter was one of the reliefs sought for in O.A. No.2204/93 he submitted that in that O.A. the applicant had sought the relief to treat this suspension period as duty as a consequential relief of the main relief sought in that O.A. of quashing the disciplinary proceedings against him and the same would not be barred by the principle of res judicata in this O.A. Relying on Explanation IV under Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure and the ruling in the case of Periya Kelu Nair Vs. Kasiyappan (AIR 1963 Ker 313) that "Any plea which if taken, would have been inconsistent with or destructive of the right or title claimed in the earlier suit is not a matter which "ought" to have been raised even though it "might" also have been raised at least in the alternative". (He quoted from the third edition of Woodroff & Ameer Ali's Code of Civil Procedure page 184, 216 & 217) and the ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme court in Sajjadamashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr.(D) by Lrs. V. Musa Dadabhai Ummer & Others (JT 2000 (2) 7 352) the learned counsel submitted that the principle of res judicata would not apply in this case. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the principle of "resjudicata" and "estoppel" apply in this O.A. The applicant had



sought the relief of treating the said period of suspension as duty in the earlier O.A. and the same had been decided by the Tribunal in O.A No.2204/93. Further the other reliefs should have raised in O.A No.138/96 and having not raised them the applicant was estopped from raising those reliefs in the present O.A. The counsel relied on the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases in support of her submissions. (i) Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Vs. T.P. Kannan (JT 1996 (8) SC 98) (ii) Babu Singh Bains & Others Vs. Union of India and Others (1996) 6 SCC 565.

6. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. In O.A. No.138/96 the second relief sought for by the applicant is as following as stated in the O.A. "(ii) Direct the respondent to take a decision as provided under Rule 1345 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code as regards the applicant's period of suspension from 15.3.1984 to 1.2.1985 etc. etc." On this relief, the tribunal directed the second respondent to pass appropriate orders on A-3 and A-4 representation. In A-4 representation he had made the following request.

"I was on suspension from 15.3.84 (ordered on 13.3.84 but effected from 15.3.84). While revoking the suspension order, the authority who revoked the order did not pass any order as to the treating of the period on duty or otherwise as required under rules. In the absence of any specific order, the period is required to be treated as spent on duty. However, as I was having 451 days of LHAP in my credit as per the leave advice on 6.2.85, I request that if the

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period of suspension from 15.3.84 to 1.2.85 i.e. 10 months and 18 days if not treated on duty, the same may kindly be treated as LHAP earned by me and in my credit"

From the above it is evident that the request in the representation was to treat the said period of suspension as duty as no specific order had been passed and in the alternative to treat the period as on LHAP available at the credit of his leave account. In the impugned order A-7 the period of suspension involved was treated as suspension. Applicant has sought quashing of A-7 and for a direction to the respondents to treat the said period as one spent on leave on half average pay and revise the applicant's pension and other retiral benefits. There is no dispute that the applicant's said suspension was in the context of disciplinary proceedings initiated against him in which he was imposed with the penalty of compulsory retirement. Against this penalty imposed on him he had filed an appeal which was also rejected. He had approached this Tribunal by filing O.A No.2204/93 in which he prayed that A-19 order (in that O.A.) of the Central Government Industrial Cum Labour Court declaring him to be not a 'workman' be quashed or in the alternative, the orders A-14 and A-17 (in that O.A.) imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement be quashed and he be reinstated with consequential benefits. The relief of consequential benefits sought in O.A. 2204/93 reads as under." To direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant back into service with all consequential benefits like arrears of salary, continuity of service, promotion, etc. duly treating the period of suspension from 14.3.84 to 1.2.85 as duty for all purposes. It was stated in A-1 order in

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that O.A. that at the time of hearing, the prayer regarding A-19 order was not argued. From A-1 order we find that the Tribunal had only set aside the appellate order as personal hearing was not granted to the applicant, after rejecting the pleas of the applicant of (i) disciplinary authority's findings being perverse or unreasonable (ii) procedural and other lapses and (iii) the incompetency of the disciplinary authority . After stating that the effect of quashing the appellate orders would be the restoration of the proceedings at the appellate level, the Tribunal decided as the applicant had reached the date of superannuation, not to remand the case back to the appellate authority for the reasons stated therein, and moulded the reliefs and directed as following:

(1) Applicant be treated as having retired on the date of his normal date of superannuation;

(2) the period from 25.5.85 when he was compulsorily retired to the date of his normal superannuation be deemed as period on suspension. This period will count for pensionary benefits. Applicant would be entitled to subsistence allowance at such rates as the disciplinary authority may fix under the Rules and the pension drawn by applicant during this period would be set off against such subsistence allowance due however, if excess amounts over and above subsistence allowance admissible have been paid as pension during this period, such excess amount shall not be recovered.

(3) Applicant will not be entitled to any other arrears or benefits such as notional promotion or pay fixation during this period and

(4) Refixation of pensionary benefits on account of the longer qualifying service in terms of the above direction, shall be done and arrears, if any, shall be paid to applicant within six months of the date of this order.

We find from the O.A. No. 2204/93 that the above were the reliefs granted against the specific consequential relief sought for treatment of the period of suspension from 15.3.84 to 1.2.85 as duty. Thus, this Tribunal had



decided on the question of treating the period as spent on duty. Thus, the treatment of the period of suspension from 15.3.84 to 1.2.85 as duty cannot be raised by the applicant in the present O.A. Thus, we find considerable force in the plea of res judicata put forth by the respondents against this relief. We also find support for this view in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in JT 2000 (2) SC 352 relied by the learned counsel for the applicant. Hon'ble Apex Court held that the summary quoted in para 18 of the judgment as a correct statement of law on Res Judicata. In para 18 learned author says "A matter in respect of which relief is claimed in an earlier suit can be said to be generally a matter 'directly and substantially' in issue but it does not mean that if the matter is one in respect of which no relief is sought it is not directly or substantially in issue." (emphasis added). It is clear from the above that relief of treating the said period of suspension of the applicant as duty sought in O.A. 2204/93 and decided by this Tribunal will be Res Judicata in the present O.A. Even if accept the plea of the learned counsel for the applicant that as the respondents did not raise the plea of Res judicata in O.A. No.138/96 for this relief ( of consideration of the suspension period in question under Rule 1345 of IREC) and therefore cannot raise the same now, we are of the view that this has no force as in O.A. 138/96 this Tribunal had not given any reasoned order for the said relief sought for by the applicant. The Tribunal had only directed the respondent to pass appropriate orders on A-3 and A-4 representation. Rule 1345 of IREC reads as follows:

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(1) When a railway servant who has been suspended is reinstated (or would have been so reinstated but for his retirement (including premature retirement) while under suspension) the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order

(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the railway servant for the period of suspension ending with reinstatement or the date of his retirement (including premature retirement), as the case may be and

(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 1343 where a railway servant under suspension dies before the disciplinary or the court proceedings instituted against him are concluded, the period between the date of suspension and the date of death shall be treated as duty for all purposes and his family shall be paid the full pay and allowances for the period to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, subject to adjustment in respect of subsistence allowance already paid.

(3) Where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the railway servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8) be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been suspended;

Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the railway servant had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation within sixty days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served on him and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him, direct for reasons to be recorded in writing, that the railway servants shall be paid for the period of such delay only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine.

(4) In a case falling under sub-rule (3) the period of suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes.

(5) In cases other than those falling under sub-rules (2) and (3) the railway servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rules (8) and (9) be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the railway servant of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within



such period (which in no case shall exceed sixty day from the date on which the notice has been served) as may be specified in the notice.

(6) Where suspension is revoked pending finalisation of the disciplinary or the court proceedings, any order passed under sub-rule (1) before the conclusion of the proceedings against the railway servant, shall be reviewed on its own motion after the conclusion of the proceedings by the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) who shall make an order according to the provisions of sub-rule (3) or sub-rule (5) as the case may be.

(7) In a case falling under sub rule (5) the period of suspension shall not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose

Provided that if the railway servant so desires, such authority may order that the period of suspension shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the Government servant.


NOTE - The order of the competent authority under the preceding proviso shall be absolute and no higher sanction shall be necessary for the grant of

(a) extraordinary leave in excess of three months in the case of temporary railway servant and  
(b) leave of any kind in excess of five years in the case of permanent or quasi-permanent railway servant.

(8) The payment of allowances under sub-rule (2), sub - rule (3) or sub - rule (5) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible

(9) The amount determined under the proviso to sub-rule (3) or under sub-rule (5) shall not be less than the subsistence allowance and other allowances admissible under Rule 1342.

7. Applicant is basing his claim for treatment of the suspension period as leave due under sub rule (6) and (7) of the Rule. Further, applicant's counsel submitted that 'may' used in the proviso under sub rule (7) should be treated as 'shall' for which he relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Jogendra Singh reported in AIR 1963 LSC 1618 . In this specific case Rule 1345 is not strictly applicable because the disciplinary proceedings came to an end by the order of this Tribunal in O.A. No.2204/93 in which appellate order alone was set aside and directions were given. It



was not because of any decision taken by the appropriate authority. Therefore, the treatment of the period of suspension which preceeded the disciplinary proceedings should also be governed by the orders of the Tribunal in O.A. No.2204/93 especially when a specific relief regarding the period of suspension was sought in that O.A. Thus, on merit we do not find any reason to interfere with the decision of the competent authority to treat the said period as 'suspension' which is in line with the decision of the Tribunal in O.A. No.2204/93 wherein the prayed for relief was not granted. Further the reinstatement of the applicant from suspension and finalisation of disciplinary proceedings took place in 1985. Therefore, cause of action under Rule 1345 had arisen in 1985 whereas this O.A. is filed in 1995. Thus, there is also force in the plea of the respondents that this claim is barred by limitation. For all these reasons we are unable to accede to this relief sought for by the applicant to treat the period of suspension as LHAP due and consequently to direct the respondents to revise the applicant's pension and other retiral benefits.

8. The next relief sought by the applicant is for a direction to the respondents to enhance the subsistence allowance by 50% from 24.8.85 to 31.10.94 in the light of Rule 1345 (a)(i) (shoud be 1342 (a)(i) as stated in ground (c) of the IREC Vol.II. According to the applicant, the deemed suspension was on account of the orders of this Tribunal and therefore there was no question of the deemed suspension being prolonged by the applicant. He relied on the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Umesh Chandra Mishra v. Union of India and Others reported in 1993 24 ATC 243. According to the

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respondents, the rate of subsistence allowance was fixed at 50% of the assumed pay by the competent authority and the contention of the applicant for its enhancement after three months was not covered under rule 1345 of the IREC. We have perused Rules 1342 and 1345 of the IREC. The applicant's claim is not covered by either of the rules. Moreover, even if Rule 1342 was applicable, the applicant has not advanced any reason as to how he is not responsible for the delay in the finalistion of his case. We find from A1 order that the litigation initiated by him had all been delayed because of his approaching the Central Government Industrial Tribunal and High court of Karnataka which were not the proper fora. He also did not press the relief of setting aside the order of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal in O.A. No.2204/93. Thus, in effect, O.A. No. 2204/93 was a fresh O.A. for all practical purposes filed after 8 years of the cause of action. Normally, if the compulsory retirement of an applicant is set aside by the Tribunal/Court, the period from the date of compulsory retirement to the date of reinstatement would be decided in accordance with Rule 1344 of IREC restricting the payment to 3 years from the date of order/judgment of the Tribunal/Court and the quantum to be decided by the respondents after affording an opportunity to the applicant. But in this case the subsistence allowance was paid as per A1 order and the respondents had decided the same for the entire period at 50% of the assumed pay. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the decision taken by the competent authority does not call for any intereference by this Tribunal. We also find that the

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judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court relied on by the applicant has no applicability in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

9. The next relief sought for by the applicant is to have his subsistence allowance calculated on and with effect from 1.1.86 based on the pay in the replaced scale under the Railway Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1986. According to the applicant in terms of Rule 5 read with Rule 2 of the Railway Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1986 a Railway Servant would draw pay on and with effect from 1.1.86 in the revised scale applicable to the post to which he was appointed and as he had not elected to draw pay in the existing scale, the subsistence allowance should be calculated with reference to the basic pay which he would have drawn had he been in service. He had drawn our attention to A2 order in this connection and also relied on the ratio of the order of the Hyderabad Bench of this tribunal in P. Xavier Vs. Chief Personnel Officer and Another reported in (1995) 31 ATC 621. A-2 is the order passed by this Tribunal dismissing his Contempt Petition. In O.A. No.138/96 filed by the applicant in accordance with the liberty given to him in A-2 order he had not raised this issue as seen from applicant's own admission in this O.A. Further, we find that even if the same was raised, only the issue of the treatment of the period of earlier suspension from 15.3.84 to 1.2.85 was taken cognizance of by the tribunal in A-5 order. Therefore, the applicant is estopped from raising this issue in the present O.A. In any case the applicant has not challenged the validity of R-1 Joint Circular dated 20/24.11.96 para 4 which governs the procedure for payment of subsistence allowance of a railway servant who was



under suspension prior to and on 1.1.86. Even in the order of the Hyderabad Bench of the tribunal relied on by the learned counsel for the applicant none of the orders of the respondents had been set aside. The rule quoted by the applicant governs the drawal of pay and the applicant was not drawing pay on 1.1.86. Therefore, we do not find any merit in this relief sought for by the applicant.

10. The next relief sought by the applicant is for a declaration that he is entitled to have his leave salary paid for 135 days of leave on average pay after deducting the leave salary already paid for 66 days. For the reasons given in the earlier paragraph and as put forth by the respondents, the applicant is estopped from raising this relief in this O.A. Further, on merits also the applicant is not entitled for this relief. According to A-8 the applicant had 135 days of LAP at his credit on 6.2.85. He is basing the claim for 135 days of leave salary on the basis of treatment of suspension period from 15.3.84 to 1.2.85 being treated as duty or leave on half average pay. That relief had not been granted by us. Therefore, the present relief has no basis and accordingly the same is rejected.

11. The next relief sought by the applicant is to declare that the period from 15.2.1967 to 27.3.1967 is liable to be treated as qualifying service for pensionary benefits and direct the respondents accordingly. According to the respondents this relief is barred by limitation and also the applicant is estopped from seeking this relief as the same was not sought in O.A. No.138/96

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and even if sought the same was not given by the Tribunal. We find considerable force in this plea. Accordingly we reject this relief.


12. We have declined to grant any of the reliefs sought for by the applicant in the above paragraphs. The same were also included in A-3 and A-4 representations. But A-7 order was passed by the second respondent in accordance with the direction of this Tribunal in A-5 order on the aspect of treatment of period of suspension under Rule 1345 of IREC. We do not find any infirmity in A-7 order dated 25.11.96, because there was no direction of this Tribunal in A-5 order to pass any orders on the other grievances included in A-3 and A-4. Hence, the relief sought for quashing A-7 order is rejected.

13. In the light of the detailed analysis and findings given by us in the foregoing paragraphs, the applicant is not entitled for any of the reliefs sought for. Accordingly, we dismiss the Original Application with no order as to costs.

Dated 28th April, 2000.



G. RAMAKRISHNAN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER



A.M. SIVADAS  
JUDICIAL MEMBER

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List of Annexures referred in this Order.

A1 A true copy of the letter No. H/P 600/III/3082 dated 25.11.96 issued by the second respondent.

A2 A true copy of the judgment in CP(C) No.108/95 in O.A. 2204/93 dated 29.9.95 delivered by this Tribunal.

A3 A true copy of the representation dated 2.10.95 submitted by the applicant to the second respondent.

A4 A true copy of the representation dated 20.9.95 submitted by the applicant to the second respondent.

A5 A true copy of the judgment in O.A. 138/96 dated 11.7.96 delivered by this Tribunal.

A6 A true copy of the representation dated 24.7.96 submitted by the applicant to the second respondent.

A8 A true copy of the letter No.H/P 420/III/SSV-JSV dated 6.2.85 issued by the second respondent.

A7 A true copy of the letter No.HP/600/III/3082 dated 25.11.96 issued by the second respondent.