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CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH

- 1) O.A. NO. 1867/2000
- 2) O.A. NO. 1871/2000
- 3) O.A. NO. 1872/2000
- 4) O.A. NO. 1875/2000
M.A. NO. 2234/2000
- 5) O.A. NO. 1894/2000
- 6) O.A. NO. 1895/2000
- 7) **O.A. NO. 1936/2000**
- 8) O.A. NO. 1938/2000
- 9) O.A. NO. 1953/2000
- 10) O.A. NO. 1975/2000
M.A. NO. 2364/2000
- 11) O.A. NO. 2027/2000

New Delhi this the 7th day of November, 2000.

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHOK AGARWAL, CHAIRMAN

HON'BLE SHRI S.A.T.RIZVI, MEMBER (A)

1) O.A. NO. 1867/2000

Surender Singh S/O Jagmal Singh,
R/O D-1, Bhagwati Garden Extension,
Uttam Nagar, New Delhi. Applicant

2) O.A. NO. 1871/2000

Arun Kumar S/O Laxman Singh,
R/O 141, Rameshwar Nagar,
Azadpur, Delhi-110033. Applicant

3) O.A. NO. 1872/2000

Kuldeep Singh S/O S.S.Rathi,
R/O E-2, Gali No.5,
Shahadatpur Extension,
Delhi-110094. Applicant

4) O.A. NO. 1875/2000
M.A. NO. 2234/2000

1. Jai Bhagwan S/O Dhir Singh,
R/O B-5/12, Sector 15, Rohini,
Delhi-110085.
2. Bhanwar Lal S/O Ram Kumar Sharma,
R/O AU-76, Uttari Pitampura,
DDA Janta Flats,
Delhi-110034.

3. Samved Singh S/O Soraj Singh,
R/O C-11/112A, Khajuri,
Delhi-110094. Applicants

5) O.A. NO. 1894/2000

Durvish Kumar S/O Tar Singh,
R/O A-1-32/19 Near Rani Public School,
Sant Nagar, Buradi Road,
Delhi. Applicant

6) O.A. NO. 1895/2000

Ravinder Singh S/O Vijay Pal Singh,
R/O B-271, Gali No.4, Prem Vihar,
Karawal Nagar, Delhi-110094. Applicant

7) O.A. NO. 1936/2000

1. Ramesh Chand S/O Gossain,
R/O RZ-482, Kailashpuri Estn.,
New Delhi.
2. Sanjeev Kumar S/O Raj Kishore Awasthi,
R/O WZ-272/4, Shrinagar,
Shakurbasti, Delhi-110034.
3. Subhash Chand S/O Ram Chander Singh,
R/O Vijaynagar Road,
Gali No.8, Barod,
Baghpat (UP).
4. Vikram Singh S/O Hari Singh,
R/O H.No.184, 1st Type,
Police Colony, Shalimar Bagh,
Delhi. Applicants

8) O.A. NO. 1938/2000

1. Satbir Singh S/O Mauji Ram,
R/O L-15, NPL Kingsway Camp,
Delhi-110009.
2. Surender Kumar S/O T.R. Sharma,
R/O 21, Jia Sarai,
New Delhi.
3. Dalbir S/O Om Prakash,
R/O G-7, Flat No.81,
Sector 16, Rohini,
Delhi-110085.
4. Jitender Kumar S/O Balbir Singh,
R/O C-18, New Police Lines,
Kingsway Camp,
Delhi-110009.
5. Sanjay Kumar S/O Ram Dhan,
R/O V & P.O. Dayalpur,
Delhi-110039. Applicants

9) O.A. NO. 1953/2000

Satyabir Singh S/O Gugan Singh,
R/O Barrack No.5, DRP Line,
Mithai Wala Pool,
Delhi-110006.

... Applicant

10) O.A. NO. 1975/2000

M.A. NO. 2364/2000

1. Vikrant Gaur S/O Amar Nath Gaur,
R/O F-84, Vill. Lado Sarai,
Mehrauli,
New Delhi-110030.

2. Sukhdev Singh S/O Navrang Singh,
R/O House No.575, Vill. Mundka,
Delhi.

... Applicants

11) O.A. NO. 2027/2000

Dilbagh Singh S/O Ram Narain,
R/O H.No.222-RZ,
Gopal Nagar, Najafgarh,
Delhi.

... Applicant

-versus-

1. Union of India through
Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs,
North Block,
New Delhi.

2. Chief Secretary,
Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
5, Sham Nath Marg,
Delhi-110054.

3. Principal Secretary (Finance),
Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
5, Sham Nath Marg,
Delhi-110009.

4. Commissioner of Police,
Police Headquarters,
I.P.Estate,
New Delhi-110002.

5. Commissioner Excise,
Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
L-Block, Vikas Bhawan,
I.P.Estate,
New Delhi-110002.

... Respondents
(in all the OAs)


Applicants by Shri A.K. Behera, Advocate.

Respondents by Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat with Shri Ajesh
Luthra and Shri Mohit Madan, Advocates.

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O R D E R (ORAL)

Shri Justice Ashok Agarwal :

Present group of applications raise similar questions of fact and law and are, therefore, being disposed of by the present common order.

2. Applicants in the present applications are police officials appointed in Delhi Police. They have been sent on deputation to the Excise Department of the Delhi Administration and have been posted in the Excise Intelligence Bureau (EIB). Their initial period of deputation was for a period of one year at the end of which, after individual performance appraisal, their deputation has been extended for a further period of one year. Their total period of deputation is ordinarily for a period of three years. By the impugned decision taken by the Excise Department, respondent No.5 herein, it has been decided to repatriate all deputationists who have completed a period of two years of deputation as on 30th September, 2000. Aforesaid decision is impugned by the applicants in the present OAs.

3. Shri Behera, the learned counsel appearing in support of the applications, has strenuously urged that aforesaid decision not only affects those whose period of deputation expires at the end of September, 2000, but also those whose period of deputation would expire much thereafter. According to him, aforesaid decision has been taken arbitrarily and capriciously without proper application of mind to individual performances of the applicants, and that the same, in

the circumstances, is liable to be quashed and set aside.

4. Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, has, with equal vehemence, submitted that the decision to send back the applicants to their parent department is a conscious policy decision taken by responsible officers in the department; the same is taken for good and valid reasons; and the same is, therefore, not liable to be interfered with by this Tribunal. In support of the aforesaid contention, she has relied upon the averments contained in para 4 of the counter which recites as under:

"4. That a meeting was held on 17th August, 2000 in the chamber of Finance Minister of NCT of Delhi where issues related to Excise Deptt. were discussed. Principal Secretary (Finance), Managing Director DSIDC, Managing Director DSCSC, Excise Commissioner were present alongwith other officers. It was felt that the excise revenue was showing a negative growth from April to July 2000 as compared with excise revenue collections for the period of April to July 1999. In August 2000, the liquor sale in bottles was also declining as compared to August 1999. This decline in sales was in spite of many policy decisions taken by the government which were supposed to encourage the sales. A few of the policy decisions taken were: reduction in the number of dry days, increasing the number of shops selling liquor, extending the selling hours of liquor vends upto 9 o' clock in the evening besides introducing a secret fund for rewarding informers to generate information regarding illicit liquor trade and smuggling. In this background, it was felt that in view of decline in sales figures of IMFL during the first 5 months of the year 2000, more stringent enforcement was needed. To tone up the enforcement, it was felt that the introduction of fresh blood in the ranks of EIB will improve the enforcement and which may in turn improve revenue collections. Therefore, it was decided that all the officials who have completed their 2 years of deputation on 30th September 2000 will be repatriated and the fresh names will be called from Delhi Police on deputation basis.

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It is submitted that if the EIB were manned by regular officials of the Excise Department the alternative of the repatriation would have been a change of posting from one branch to another. In this case, however, officials are on deputation and the posting is a very sensitive one where the officials are expected to discharge their duties with full vigour and wisdom. The decision to repatriate the officials who had completed two years even if they had been granted extension was in the administrative interest. In pursuance of this decision, Additional Commissioner of Police (Estt.) was informed vide this office letter dated 8th September about the intended repatriation of the individuals who had completed two years of deputation in this department. He was also requested to forward to this department the names of eligible and interested officials to fill up the vacancies that would have been created after the repatriation of the individuals.

It is further submitted that the continuation in the department by the deputationists is not their legal right. It is also submitted that there is no legal stigma involved in the present case of the officials who have put in two years of service. It is an administrative prerogative to repatriate a deputationist back to his parent cadre taking into account his performance. As per GOI Department of Personnel & Training O.M. No.2/29/92-Estt. (Pay-II) dated 5th January 1994 (quoted in Swamy's Manual) deputationist services can be returned to his parent cadre after giving advance intimation of reasonable period to the lending ministry/department and the employee concerned. In the present case, advance intimation of the repatriation of the applicants was already sent to their parent department i.e. Delhi Police on 8.9.2000. Notice of the intended repatriation would have been issued to the applicants immediately upon the completion of procedural formalities for the appointment of their substitutes."

5. We have considered the rival contentions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the contending parties at some length and we are of the considered view that the present applications do not merit favourable consideration and the same are liable to be dismissed. We have also considered the aforesaid reasons which find place in the counter

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which have persuaded the relevant authorities to take the aforesaid decision, and we find that the aforesaid decision is a policy decision which cannot be interfered with by courts. It was found that the excise revenue had been showing a downward trend from April to July, 2000 as compared to the excise revenue collections for the corresponding period in 1999. This, it was felt, was on account of increase in smuggling of liquor from across the border. It was felt that this was due to the adverse functioning of the enforcement branch of the Excise Department. Aforesaid decision, it appears, was taken to ensure an effective supervision over the enforcement branch with a view to minimise the smuggling from across the border. It was also felt that the best indicator of effective prevention of smuggling would be the increase in the sales of bottles of Indian manufactured foreign liquor. In the circumstances, a decision ^{had been} taken that all officials in the enforcement branch who were going to or had completed two years of deputation on 30th September, 2000 should be repatriated. It ~~was~~ ^{is} therefore, felt that introduction of fresh blood in the ranks of EIB would improve the enforcement which in turn would improve the revenue collections. Hence, a decision ^{had been} taken that all officials who had completed their two years of deputation on 30th September, 2000 should be repatriated and fresh names ~~should~~ be called from Delhi Police for being deputed to the EIB.

6. Apart from the aforesaid decision being a policy decision which, in our view, has been taken for just and good reasons which have been enumerated

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hereinabove, we find that the applicants do not possess any right to continue on deputation till their present tenure of deputation has expired. As per Government of India, Department of Personnel & Training O.M. No.2/29/92-Estt.(Pay-II) dated 5th January, 1994, services of a deputationist can be returned to his parent cadre after giving advance intimation of reasonable period to the lending ministry/department and the employee concerned. As far as the lending ministry/department, i.e., Delhi Police, is concerned, an advance intimation had already been sent to them on 8th September, 2000. Before a similar advance intimation could be served on the applicants, they ~~had~~ proceeded to institute the present OAs and ^{have} also succeeded in obtaining ad interim orders of restraint in their favour and against the respondents. That the applicants have rushed to the Tribunal with the present applications indicates that they must have been informed of the aforesaid decision by their parent department. ^{They therefore have the requisite notice.} This is a reasonable inference which can legitimately be drawn from the aforesaid facts.

7. Shri Behera, the learned counsel, has by his rejoinder pointed out three instances where officials whose two years of deputation had already expired by 30th September, 2000 have been continued on deputation. Based on these instances, he has submitted that the aforesaid decision to repatriate the officials is not being uniformly pursued; there is an element of pick-and-choose and hence the decision is liable to be quashed and struck down on this ground as well. Mrs. Ahlawat, on the other

hand, on taking instructions, has pointed out that the aforesaid three officials do not belong to the executive cadre as the applicants; they belong to the ministerial cadre who have been brought on deputation for streamlining the computerisation of records; their cases are, therefore, distinct and cannot be confused with those of the applicants; even their services will be repatriated after the present job of computerisation is over. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find that the objection of Shri Behera can be sustained.

8. Shri Behera has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (1991) 1 SCC 212, in support of his proposition that the services of the applicants cannot be repatriated at one stroke as has been done in the instant case without considering the merits of each individual applicant. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision was considering an order which sought to terminate the services of all the existing government counsel in all the districts of U.P. The aforesaid order insofar as is relevant reads as under :

"Subject : Renewal of tenure of all the existing Government Counsel, calling of new panels for new appointment.

I have been directed to inform you on the subject mentioned above that the administration has taken a decision to extend the tenure of all the Government Counsel, who are presently working, till February 28, 1990 only and to immediately receive new panels from the District Magistrates for new appointments in their places.

2. I, therefore, have been directed to state that all the government Counsel, presently engaged for the work of Civil/ Revenue/Criminal (including Anti-Dacoity) and

Urban Ceiling may be permitted to work till February 28, 1990 only and for appointments in their place, administration may send the new panels, after preparing the same in following manner :

xxxxx xxxx"

On the aforesaid facts, the Supreme Court has gone on to observe as under :

"41. The impugned circular itself does not indicate the compelling reason, if any, for the drastic step of replacing all the Government Counsel in every branch at the district level throughout the State of U.P., irrespective of the fact whether the tenure of the incumbent had expired or not. The learned Additional Advocate General stated that the circular was issued because the existing panels were made in 1985, 1986 and 1987 and were considered to be not too proximate in point of time in the year 1990 for being continued. The reason, if any, for considering such en bloc change necessary has not been disclosed either in the circular or at the hearing in addition to what is said in para 29 of the counter-affidavit of A.K.Singh, which is referred to later. On behalf of the petitioners/appellants, it was alleged that the en masse change at the district level throughout the State of U.P. was made only for political reasons on account of the recent change in the State Government. We deem it unnecessary to go into this question for want of any specific material either way. Moreover, the arbitrariness, if any, of such an act, would be equally applicable irrespective of the change in the government, which, if at all, would only strengthen the argument in case arbitrariness is proved otherwise. The only reason given in the counter-affidavit of A.K. Singh, Joint Secretary and Joint Legal Remembrancer, government of U.P., is in para 29 thereof which reads as under :

"That the contents of para 38 of the writ petition are not admitted. It is denied that the government took the present decision with a political motive and in an arbitrary manner. It is also submitted that the decision to terminate the professional engagement has been taken in order to streamline the conduct of the government cases and effective prosecution thereof."

42. It is difficult to appreciate this as a reasonable basis for the drastic and sweeping action throughout the State, particularly when the provisions in the Legal

Remembrancer's Manual referred earlier provide ordinarily for renewal of the tenure of the appointees. To say the least, the contents of para 29 of this counter-affidavit which alone are relied on to disclose the reasons for the circular are beautifully vague and convey nothing of substance and cannot furnish any tangible support to the impugned circular. It was stated by the learned Additional Advocate General that many of the old incumbents were to be re-appointed even after this exercise and, therefore, a wholesale change was not to be made. If at all, this submission discloses a further infirmity in the impugned circular. If it be true that many of the existing appointees were to be continued by giving them fresh appointments, the action of first terminating their appointment and then giving them fresh appointment is, to say the least, uninformed by reason and does not even fall within the scope of the disclosed reason 'to streamline the conduct of government cases and effective prosecution thereof.' It is obvious that at least in respect of all such appointees who are to be continued by giving them fresh appointments, the act of terminating their appointment in one stroke, was without application of mind by anyone to the question whether a change was at all needed in their case. It would be too much to assume that every government Counsel in all the districts of the State of U.P. was required to be replaced in order to streamline the conduct of government cases and indeed, that is not even the case of the State which itself says that many of them were to be re-appointed.

43. Non-application of the mind to individual cases before issuing a general circular terminating all such appointments throughout the State of U.P. is itself eloquent of the arbitrariness writ large on the face of the circular. It is obvious that issuance of the impugned circular was not governed by any rule but by the whim or fancy of someone totally unaware of the requirements of rule of law, neatly spelled out in the case of John Wilkes (1984) 3 All ER 935 more than two centuries back and quoted with approval by this Court almost a quarter century earlier in Jaisinghani case AIR 1967 SC 1427. We have considered it necessary to re-emphasize this aspect and reiterate what has been said so often by this Court only because we find that some persons entrusted with the task of governance appear to be unaware of the fact that the exercise of discretion they have must be governed by rule, not by humour, whim, caprice or fancy or personal predilections. It also disturbs us to find that the Legal Remembrancer's Department of the State of U.P. which has the duty to correctly advise the State Government in such matters, overlooked the

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obvious and failed to discharge its bounden duty of correctly advising the State Government in matters of law. We would like to believe that the impugned circular was issued for want of proper legal advice in this behalf instead of any ulterior motive suggested by the petitioners/appellants.

44. Conferment of the power together with the discretion which goes with it to enable proper exercise of the power is coupled with the duty to shun arbitrariness in its exercise and to promote the object for which the power is conferred, which undoubtedly is public interest and not individual or private gain, whim or caprice of any individual. All persons entrusted with any such power have to bear in mind its necessary concocomitant which alone justifies conferment of power under the rule of law. This was apparently lost sight of in the present case while issuing the impugned circular.

45. Arbitrariness is writ large in the impugned circular dated February 6, 1990 issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh. It gives the impression that this action was taken under the mistaken belief of applicability of "spoils system" under our Constitution and the cavalier fashion in which the action has been taken gives it the colour of treating the posts of DGCs as bounty to be distributed by the appointing authority at its sweet will. Such a change even by a private party is made keeping in view his own interest when he finds that the existing lawyer is not suitable for the assignment and, therefore, without making the change he incurs the risk of some loss. In the case of the State it is the public interest which should be the prime guiding consideration to judge the suitability of the appointee but it appears that the impugned State action was taken in the present case with only one object in view, that is, to terminate all existing appointments irrespective of the subsistence or expiry of the tenure or suitability of the existing incumbents.

46. Viewed in any manner, the impugned circular dated February 6, 1990 is arbitrary. It terminates all the appointments of Government Counsel in the districts of the State of Uttar Pradesh by an omnibus order, even though these appointments were all individual. No common reason applicable to all of them justifying their termination in one stroke on a reasonable ground has been shown.....



9. In our judgment, aforesaid decision can have no application to the facts arising in the present cases. Aforesaid decision related to a decision to disengage government counsel which had the effect of terminating their employment as such. That is not the case of the present applicants. All that has been sought to be done is to send them back to their parent department. As far as government counsel are concerned they cannot be equated with government servants. As far as applicants are concerned, they are civil servants and they are bound by the rules which govern their service conditions. As far as their deputation is concerned, they, as per the aforesaid circular of the DOP&T, can be repatriated even before the expiry of their tenure after giving reasonable notice. As far as the services of government counsel are concerned, these are individual services rendered by counsel. Their performances are individually judged. As far as the applicants are concerned, they are deputationists and hence a blanket order can legitimately be passed which could not have been passed in case of lawyers. Their services are liable to be repatriated even though their services may have been found by the officials of the government to be meritorious. As already stated the impugned decision is a conscious policy decision taken by and at the behest of high officials. It is a government decision and a policy decision. The same, therefore, cannot be lightly interfered with by the Tribunal. Moreover, the said decision has been taken for good and cogent reasons. The same, therefore, cannot be lightly faulted.

N. V. J.

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10. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the present applications are devoid of merit. The same are, in the circumstances, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

(S.A.T.Rizvi)
Member (A)

(Ashok Agarwal)
Chairman

/as/

Attested
Agarwal
C.S. CE