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CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH

O. A. NO. 747/1999

New Delhi this the 30th day of February, 2003

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE V.S. AGGARWAL, CHAIRMAN

HON'BLE SHRI S.K. MALHOTRA, MEMBER (A)

Shri Anupam Rajan, IAS
S/o Shri Umesh Kumar Sinha
Chief Executive Officer
Zila Panchyat
Shivpuri
Madhya Pradesh.

..... Applicant

(Shri G.D. Gupta, Advocate with
Shri A.K. Behra, Advocate)

-versus-

1. The Union of India through
The Secretary
Ministry of Public Grievances & Pensions,
Department of Personnel & Training
North Block
New Delhi.
2. State of Madhya Pradesh
through the Secretary
General Administration Department
Mantralaya, Vallabh Bhawan
Bhopal (M.P.)
3. Union Public Service Commission
through the Secretary
Dholpur House, Shahjahan Road
New Delhi.
4. Collector
Rajgarh
Madhya Pradesh.

... Respondents

(By Shri R.V. Sinha, Advocate)

O R D E R

Justice V.S. Aggarwal:

Doctrine of lifting the veil is well
established. Whenever there appears the

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smokescreen, the Court/Tribunal would tear-off the mask and see the real face of the transaction. This is what is being urged before us. Therefore, we firstly take up the facts. The applicant Anupam Rajan had appeared in the Civil Services Examination 1992. He had opted for the Indian Administrative Service as his first preference on being selected. The result of the Civil Services Examination was declared. He was successful. According to the applicant, the result was declared on 3.6.1993. The vacancies in the Indian Administrative Service were only tentative in nature. Number of seats was likely to vary. His merit list was on the borderline. Therefore, he had taken the Civil Services (Preliminary) Examination, 1993 for which he had applied on 22.2.1993.

2. Vide, the impugned order dated 30.8.1996, the applicant was discharged from service. By virtue of the present application, he seeks quashing of the order discharging him from service alleged to be stigmatic and also the order dated 16.4.1996 whereby his probation period was extended.

3. It appears that the applicant had already been declared successful and had scored 52nd

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position in the Indian Administrative Service where there were 61 vacancies. There was a complaint made that during the Civil Services (Preliminary) Examination, 1993, there was a nexus between the applicant and one Shri Ashraf Jamal. Both of them swapped of their answer sheets. The applicant wrote for Shri Ashraf Jamal in Sociology paper who ultimately passed the examination while the applicant did not qualify the said examination. The Union Public Service Commission had found obliteration in Roll Numbers in the single page answer sheet in case of the applicant and the said Shri Ashraf Jamal. The matter was referred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The Central Bureau of Investigation had registered a case and investigated the matter. On basis of the investigations, the Central Bureau of Investigation had concluded that the allegations made by the Union Public Service Commission were correct. A charge-sheet was filed on 13.2.1995 in the court of the Metropolitan Magistrate at New Delhi for criminal conspiracy along with another to cheat the authorities of the Union Public Service Commission and forging the answer sheets of the Civil Services (Preliminary) Examination, 1993. A notice had been issued to the applicant to show cause within 30 days from the date of receipt of the same as to why he should not be discharged from the Indian

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Administrative Service. The applicant had submitted his representation and contested the assertions. On basis of the enquiry conducted by the Union Public Service Commission and corroborated by the investigations of the Central Bureau of Investigation, irrespective of the pending criminal trial, it was deemed appropriate to discharge the applicant from service on the ground that he lacked qualities of mind and character needed for the service. Accordingly, the impugned order discharging him from service had been passed. Needless to state that earlier, the probation period of the applicant had been extended.

4. The said order so passed is being challenged.

5. The first and foremost argument advanced has been that the impugned order had been passed by way of punishment without holding an inquiry and, therefore, the order whereby the applicant had been discharged from service cannot be sustained. Needless to state that according to the respondents, perusal of the order clearly shows that it is not by way of punishment. There are no adverse consequences on the career of the applicant and it is simplicitor order of termination/discharge of the applicant from service.

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6. Before proceeding further, it would be necessary to look into the Indian Administrative Service (Probation) Rules, 1954. Under Rule 3, every person recruited for the service in accordance with the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1955 shall be appointed to the service on probation for a period of two years. Sub-rule (2) to Rule 3 further states that every person recruited to the service in accordance with the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1956 or by the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Selection) Regulations, 1956 shall be appointed to the service on probation for a period of one year. Sub-rule (3) to Rule 3 reads:-

"(3) The Central Government may, if it so thinks fit, in any case extend the period of probation for a period of one year."

Sub-rule (3-A) to Rule 3 further clarifies that notwithstanding anything contained in sub rule (3), if during the period of probation, a probationer is placed under suspension pending investigation, inquiry, trial relating to a criminal charge or disciplinary proceedings which are contemplated, the period of probation may be extended for such period as the Central Government may deem fit in

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the facts and circumstances of the case. Rule 12 permits discharge of a probationer on certain grounds and unfolds itself in the following words:-

"12. Discharge of a probationer.-A Probationer shall be liable to be discharged from Service or, as the case may be reverted to the permanent post on which he holds a lien or would hold a lien had it not been suspended under the rules applicable to him prior to his appointment to the Service, if-

- (a) he fails to pass three-examination under rule 9, or
- (b) if the Central Government is satisfied that the probationer was ineligible for recruitment to the Service or is unsuitable for being a member of the Service, or
- (c) in the opinion of the Central Government he has wilfully neglected his probationary studies or duties, or
- (d) he is found lacking in qualities of mind and character needed for the service, or
- (e) he fails to comply with any of the provisions of these rules.

Provided that except a case falling under Cl.(a) above, the Central Government shall hold a summary enquiry before passing an order under these rules."

It permits the Central Government besides other grounds referred to above to discharge a probationer if he is found lacking in qualities of mind and character needed for the service. It further provides that except in the cases falling under clause (a), the Central Government shall hold a summary inquiry before passing an order under the rules.

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7. Whether in the facts of the case, can it be termed that it was a simple case of discharge contemplated or not?

8. The Supreme Court in the case of **Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India** [1958] SCR 828 had set the law into motion. It was held that Article 311 of the Constitution does not in terms say that protection of that article extends only to persons who are permanent members of the service or who hold permanent civil posts. Article 311 which was stated to be in the nature of proviso to Article 310 makes no distinction between permanent and temporary posts and extends its protection equally to all Government servants holding permanent or temporary posts or even if they were officiating in any one of those posts. Protection of Article 311 can be available where dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is sought to be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise. Necessarily, if by way of punishment, the order is so passed, the rigour of the decision in the case of **Parshotam Lal Dhingra** (supra) would come into play.

9. Subsequently, another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of **Union Territory of Tripura and another v. Gopal Chandra Dutta Choudhuri**, AIR 1963 SC 601 was considering a similar

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controversy. Therein, Shri Gopal Chandra Dutta Choudhuri, who was a respondent before the Supreme Court, had been appointed as a Constable in the Police Force. His employment was temporary and was liable to be terminated with one month's notice. The Superintendent of Police informed him that his services would be terminated from a particular date. He had challenged the said order and a similar question had come up for consideration. The Supreme Court in the facts concluded that the order had not been preceded by any enquiry and further held that it was an order of dismissal to attract Article 311 of the Constitution. In paragraph 5, the findings were:-

"The order in terms merely terminates the service of the respondent; it was not preceded by any enquiry for ascertaining whether the respondent was guilty of any misdemeanour, misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or a similar cause. In the order on appeal filed to the Chief Commissioner it is recited that the respondent was "an ex-convict for theft and therefore nothing could be done for" him, but the purport thereof is somewhat obscure. The memorandum of appeal filed before the Chief Commissioner was not tendered in evidence, and there is nothing in the order suggesting that the employment of the respondent was terminated because he had, before he was employed on April 18, 1954, been convicted by a Criminal Court for theft. It appears from the order of the Chief Commissioner dated May 26, 1958 that the respondent had applied for re-employment in the Police Force and the Chief Commissioner was of the opinion that because the respondent was "an ex-convict in a case of theft" he could not be re-employed. There is no ground for inferring that the Superintendent of Police was seeking to

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camouflage an order of dismissal by giving it the form of termination of employment in exercise of the authority under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules. It cannot be assumed that an order ex facie one of termination of employment of a temporary employee was intended to be one of dismissal. The onus to prove that such was the intention of the authority terminating the employment must lie upon the employee concerned; but about the intention of the Superintendent of Police there is no evidence except the order of that authority."

10. A few years later, in the case of *Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab and anr.*, 1974(2) S.L.R. 701, an identical question had come up for consideration. Shamsher and another were appointed as Subordinate Judges. Their services had been terminated. It was held by the Supreme Court that the form of the order is not decisive. Even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the facts and circumstances establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave character of misconduct had been made and stigma cast. In Paragraph 71, the Supreme Court held:-

"The order of termination of the service of Ishwar Chand Agarwal is clearly by way of punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court not only denied Ishwar Chand Agarwal the protection under Art.311 but also denied itself the degnified control over the subordinate judiciary. The form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment. Even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the facts and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave character

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of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provisions of Article 311. In such a case the simplicity of the form of the order will not be of any sanctity. That is exactly what has happened in the case of Ishwar Chand Agarwal. The order of termination is illegal and must be set aside."

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer in a separate judgement but concurring described the words "form", "substance", "motive" and "foundation" as facets of one aspect. The other controversies that had arisen in the case of Shamesher Singh (supra) are not relevant to be gone into in the facts of the present case.

11. The decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India and another, 1984(1) SLR 426 is illuminatory. Anoop Jaiswal like the applicant had made his grade by selection by the Union Public Service Commission in Indian Police Service. He was undergoing training as a probationer at the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy, Hyderabad. All the probationers were excepted to be present at 5.50 A.M. at the field where the ceremonial drill practice was to be conducted. It was raining at that time and the venue was shifted to Gymnasium Hall. When the Assistant Director reached the Gymnasium, none of the probationers had reached there. They came 22 minutes late. When a messenger was sent to call the probationers, they

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had asked for a vehicle to go to the place as it was raining. Anoop Jaiswal was taken to be one of the ring leaders. An order was issued that Anoop Jaiswal was unsuitable for being a member of the said Service and he was discharged under Rule 12 of the Indian Police Service (Probation) Rules, 1954. One of the contentions raised before the Supreme Court was that though the order on the face of it appeared to carry no stigma, in reality it was an order terminating his services on the ground of misconduct and, therefore, without holding an inquiry as contemplated under Article 311 of the Constitution, action could not be taken against Anoop Jaiswal. The Supreme Court held that the alleged act of misconduct in not joining the drill and other actions of Anoop Jaiswal were foundation for the action taken against him. The Supreme Court further held that it attracted Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the impugned order could not be sustained. In paragraph 15, the Supreme Court thereupon while allowing the appeal of Anoop Jaiswal held:-

"15. A narration of the facts of the case leaves no doubt that the alleged act of misconduct on June 22, 1981 was the real foundation for the action taken against the appellant and that the other instances stated in the course of the counter affidavit are mere allegations which are put forward only for purposes of strengthening the defence which is otherwise very weak. The case is one which attracted Article 311(2) of the Constitution as the impugned order amounts to a termination of service by

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way of punishment and an enquiry should have been held in accordance with the said constitutional provision. That admittedly having not been done, impugned order is liable to be struck down. We accordingly set aside the judgement of the High Court and the impugned order dated November 9, 1981 discharging the appellant from service. The appellant should now be reinstated in service with the same rank and seniority he was entitled to before the impugned order was passed as if it had not been passed at all. He is also entitled to all consequential benefits including the appropriate year of allotment and the arrears of salary and allowances upto the date of his reinstatement. The appeal is accordingly allowed."

Similar question again came up before the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Rajinder Kaur v. Punjab State and another, AIR 1986 SC 1790. Smt. Rajinder Kaur, referred to was a Constable. The Superintendent of Police had discharged her from service. Though it was stated in the order that it was on the ground of inefficiency but it was on the basis of an enquiry into the misconduct of staying in nights with male constable. No enquiry had been held. The Supreme Court referred to the decision of Anoop Jaiswal (supra) that form of the order could be camouflage and that if the order in reality is a cloak for an order of punishment, the court would not be debarred merely because of the form of the order in giving effect to the rights conferred upon the employee. The appeal of Rajinder Kaur was allowed and in the facts, it was held that it was by way of punishment. The operative part of the judgement of the Supreme

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Court reads:-

"13. On a conspectus of all these decisions mentioned hereinbefore, the irresistible conclusion follows that the impugned order of discharge though couched in innocuous terms, is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal from service on the ground of misconduct. This order has been made without serving the appellant any charge-sheet; without asking for any explanation from her and without giving any opportunity to show cause against the purported order of dismissal from service and without giving any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined, that is, in other words the order has been made in total contravention of the provisions of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. The impugned order is, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside. A writ of certiorari be issued on the respondents to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 9.9.1980 of her dismissal from service. A writ in the nature of mandamus and appropriate directions be issued to allow the appellant to be reinstated in the post from which she has been discharged. The appeal is thus allowed with costs. The authorities concerned will pay all her emoluments to which she is entitled to in accordance with the extant rules as early as possible in any case not later than eight weeks from the date of this judgment."

12. However, in the case of Bishan Lal Gupta v. The State of Haryana and ors., AIR 1978 SC 363, the Supreme Court had held that a less formal inquiry should be sufficient to determine whether a probationer who has no fixed or fully formed right should be allowed to continue or not. The difference was noted as between the permanent and temporary employees. The Supreme Court in this regard on the facts of the case held:-

"He had ample opportunity to answer in

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writing whatever was alleged against him. No rule was shown to us to support the view that anything more was needed if the intention was not to hold a full departmental trial to punish but a summary inquiry to determine only suitability to continue in service. The High Court was not satisfied with his explanations. It is difficult to see how a fuller enquiry, as contemplated by Art. 311 of the Constitution, which also only requires a "reasonable opportunity of being heard" in respect of the charges made, could improve his position. It may be that, if the petitioner had acquired a right to the post and was not a mere probationer whose services were being terminated, he could have technically speaking claimed a formally fuller process of hearing before he could be punished for a fault. But, in the case before us, the petitioner had no right to continue in service despite adequate reasons for terminating his services. He could, therefore, only claim a hearing which was reasonably sufficient and appropriate for determining whether there were adequate reasons to continue him in service, even if he could not be removed by way of punishment without a fuller inquiry."

13. The entire law on the subject had again been reviewed by the Apex Court in the case of *Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd.* and another, (1999) 2 SCC 21. The Supreme Court while referring to the words, "form", "substance", "motive" and "foundation" used in the earlier decisions recorded that difficulties, if any, had been removed after the decision in the case of *Shamsher Singh (supra)* and it was observed:-

"26. If there was any difficulty as to what was "motive" or "foundation" even after *Shamsher Singh* case the said doubts, in our opinion, were removed in *Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor*

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Sabha, 1980 SCC (L&S) 197 again by Krishna Iyer, J. No doubt, it is a labour matter but the distinction so far as what is "motive" or "foundation" is common to labour cases and cases of employees in the government or the public sector. The learned Judge again referred to the criticism by Shri Tripathi in this branch of law as to what was "motive" or what was "foundation", a criticism to which reference was made in Shamsher Singh case.

It was further held:-

"27. In other words, it will be a case of motive if the master, after gathering some prima facie facts, does not really wish to go into their truth but decides merely not to continue a dubious employee. The master does not want to decide or direct a decision about the truth of the allegations. But if he conducts an enquiry only for the purpose of proving the misconduct and the employee is not heard, it is a case where the enquiry is the foundation and the termination will be bad."

Thereupon the Supreme Court went on to conclude that these are obviously not cases where the employer feels that there is a mere cloud against the employee's conduct but are cases where the employer has virtually accepted the definitive and clear findings of the enquiry officer which are all arrived at behind the back of the employee. That is why the misconduct is the foundation and not merely the motive in such cases. Where the statements of the witnesses were recorded at the back of the delinquent and a termination was recommended followed by the order of termination, the Supreme Court held that the findings are definitive. It was a foundation for termination

and not merely the motive and the Supreme Court held:-

"36. In our view, it is an absolutely clear case where the enquiry officer examined witnesses, recorded their statements and gave a clear finding of the appellant accepting a bribe and even recommended his termination. All these were done behind the back of the appellant. The Managing Director passed the termination order the very next day. It cannot, in the above circumstances, be stated by any stretch of imagination that the report is a preliminary enquiry report. Its findings are definitive. It is not a preliminary report where some facts are gathered and a recommendation is made for a regular departmental enquiry. In view of the principles laid down in the cases referred to above, this case is an obvious case where the report and its findings are the foundation of the termination order and not merely the motive. The Tribunal was right in its conclusion. The High Court was in grave error in treating such a report as a preliminary report."

14. Once again in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 60, a similar question had come up for consideration. The Supreme Court considered four questions, namely;-

- (1) In what circumstances, termination of a probationer's services can be said to be founded on misconduct and in what

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circumstances could it be said that allegations were only a motive;

(2) When can an order of termination of a probationer be said to contain an express stigma;

(3) Can stigma be gathered by referring back to proceedings referred to in termination order; and

(4) Whether the appellant was entitled to any relief. On point (3), the Court further considered whether stigma could be inferred from three letters referred to in the impugned termination order though this order itself did not contain anything offensive."

The answers given by the Supreme Court are:-

"Point I: If findings are arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, simple order of termination is to be treated as 'founded' on the allegations and will be bad. If, however enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if employer did not want to enquire into truth of allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he

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was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be motive and not foundation and simple order of termination would be valid.

Point 2: There is considerable difficulty in finding out whether in a given case where the order of termination is not a simple order of termination, the words used in the order can be said to contain a 'stigma'. It depends on facts and circumstances of each case and language or words used to ascertain whether termination order contains stigma.

Point 3: Material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in termination order of a probationer but might be contained in documents referred to in the termination order or in its annexures. Such documents can be asked for, or called for, by any future employer of the probationer. In such a case, employee's interests would be harmed and therefore termination order would stand vitiated on the ground that no regular enquiry was conducted.

Point 4.: Language of letter dated 11.12.1995 clearly points out that the instances referred to therein were not mere allegations against the appellant. Had these been mere allegations, it would have been a case of motive but this letter points out definitive conclusions of misconduct which give rise to an inescapable conclusion that these findings were part of foundation of impugned termination order. It is not a case of mere motive. Contents of three letters referred to in the impugned termination order are clearly in the nature of stigma."

15. It is on the touch-stone of the aforesaid that we can draw necessary conclusions that this Tribunal is competent to go behind the object and the motive in the order if the enquiry as to misconduct is conducted at the back of the officer. Without regular enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as founded on the allegations. The language used is not material.

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The stigma, if any, can always be determined on the facts of each case. When it is not mere allegations but findings, then it would be foundation of the impugned order.

16. It is in the back-drop of the aforesaid decisions in law that the facts of the present controversy have to be looked into. The respondents insist that the enquiry was only conducted to ensure as to whether the applicant was a fit person to be retained or not. At the risk of repetition, we are re-stating the facts. The applicant is alleged to have taken the second Civil Services (Preliminary) Examination 1993 so as to illegally help Shri Ashraf Jamal. A specific finding seemingly had been arrived at and in paragraph 4.15 of the counter filed by the Union of India, it had been averred :-

"Shri Anupam Rajan has been discharged from the service under the Probation Rules because his conduct of appearing in the examination without any proper sanction and his involvement in the act of swapping of answer sheets with his friend with the obvious intention of helping him in the examination to defraud the UPSC reflects on his lack of qualities of mind and character needed for the service. The enquiry done by the UPSC on the basis of which a reference was made to the CBI for initiating criminal proceedings and the investigations by the CBI clearly establish a criminal nexus between Shri Anupam Rajan and his friend Shri Ashraf Jamal."

In other words, they are relying upon the findings

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of the Union Public Service Commission on an enquiry on basis of which a reference was made to the Central Bureau of Investigation for initiating criminal proceedings. They rely further upon the fact that investigations established a criminal nexus between the applicant and Shri Ashraf Jamal. They also rely upon the fact that the applicant and Shri Ashraf Jamal alleged to have swapped their answer sheets.

17. Our attention has also been drawn to the impugned order that had been passed on 30.8.1996 on basis of which the applicant was discharged from service. A perusal of the same clearly shows that they arrived at a conclusion that the Union Public Service Commission had found a nexus between the applicant and Shri Ashraf Jamal. They swapped of their answer sheets. They also rely upon the investigation and mentioned:-

"The enquiry done by the UPSC on the basis of which a reference was made to the CBI for initiating criminal proceedings and the investigations by the CBI clearly establish a nexus between Shri Anupam Rajan and his friend Shri Ashraf Jamal and the fact that they swapped the answer sheets in the Sociology Optional paper. The enquiry and investigation have clearly established that the answer sheet belonging to Shri Ashraf Jamal has been written by Shri Anupam Rajan and that Shri Anupam Rajan solved the question paper of Sociology for Shri Ashraf Jamal in the Civil Services (Preliminary) Examinations, 1993. Thus the conduct of Shri Rajan in appearing at the Civil Services (Preliminary) Examination, 1993 for which he was not eligible and further to

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associate in solving the question paper of Sociology for Shri Ashraf Jamal in the said examination, in the considered view of the Government reflects lack of quality of mind and character needed for the Service."

A satisfaction thereafter is recorded on basis of the enquiry by the Union Public Service Commission and corroborated by the Central Bureau of Investigation that the applicant was not entitled to appear under the Rules and for the act of swapping of the answer sheets, criminal proceedings were initiated.

18. Thereupon stating that irrespective of the outcome of the criminal trial, the services of the applicant were stated to be not required **is inconsequential**.

19. Since the form of the order is not material, it could be camouflage and an enquiry as such had been conducted and findings arrived at. It is obviously the foundation for alleged action of misconduct. The real foundation is the finding arrived at on basis of the detailed enquiry. Consequently, the decisions in the case of Anoop Jaiswal and that of Radhey Shyam (supra) of the Supreme Court come to the rescue of the applicant because the inquiry officer had examined witnesses and recorded their statements. A clear finding has been arrived at in the investigation about the conduct of the applicant which we have referred to

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
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above. This was done at the back of the applicant. The services of the applicant thereupon had been terminated. Thus, it cannot be stated that it was a simple summary enquiry. The findings are definite. It cannot be termed to be a preliminary enquiry. Therefore, we reiterate that it was the foundation of the termination order and not merely motive.

20. We allow the present application but we do not deem it necessary to consider other controversies which were also agitated which may be embarrassing for either party. We dispose of the application with the following directions:-

- (1) The impugned order dated 30.8.1996 is quashed;
- (2) Nothing said herein need be taken any expression on the merits of the matter and the conduct of the applicant pertaining to his appearing in the Civil Service Examination, 1993 and alleged swapping of the paper with Shri Ashraf Jamal; and
- (3) The respondents would be at liberty to take any further action against the applicant as may be deemed appropriate in accordance with law

No costs.


(S.K. Malhotra)
Member (A)


(V.S. Aggarwal)
Chairman

/sns/